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'Love is Just a Four-Letter Word': Sexuality, International Human Rights, and Therapeutic Jurisprudence

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One of the most controversial social policy issues that remains underdiscussed in scholarly literature is the sexual autonomy of persons with disabilities. This population has faced a double set of conflicting prejudices: on one hand, people with disabilities are infantilized (as not being capable of having the same range of sexual desires, needs and expectations as persons without disabilities), and on the other hand, this population is demonized (as being hypersexual, unable to control primitive urges). Although attitudes about the capabilities of persons with disabilities are changing for the better, attitudes toward persons with disabilities engaging in sexual behavior have remained firmly in place for centuries. However, the ratification of the United Nations’ Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) demands we reconsider these attitudes.

This paper will (1) review the history of how legal and social issues regarding sexuality have been ignored and trivialized by policy makers and the general public; (2) highlight sections of the CRPD that force us to reconsider the scope of this issue; (3) offer suggestions as to how states must change domestic policy to comport with CRPD mandates; and (4) consider the implications of therapeutic jurisprudence insights for the resolution of these issues.

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I. **Introduction**

One of the most controversial social policy issues that remains dramatically under-discussed in scholarly literature is the sexual autonomy of persons with psychosocial and intellectual disabilities, especially those who are institutionalized. This population – always marginalized and stigmatized – has traditionally faced a double set of conflicting prejudices: on one hand, people with disabilities are infantilized (as not being capable of having the same range of sexual...
desires, needs and expectations as persons without disabilities), and on the other hand, this population is demonized (as being hypersexual, unable to control base or primitive urges). Although attitudes about the abilities and capabilities of persons with disabilities are changing for the better, it remains true that, “many people still struggle to accept that mentally disabled individuals engage in sexual activity.”

Even as the “sexual revolution” in the United States recognized sex and sexuality were needs rather than simply desires, persons with disabilities were left out of this shift in perception. Attitudes toward persons with disabilities engaging in

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1. See e.g. Maya Sabatello, “Disability, Human Rights and Global Health: Past, Present, Future” in Michael Freeman, Sarah Hawkes & Belinda Bennett, eds, Law and Global Health: Current Legal Issues, vol 16 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) (“women with disabilities are . . . assumed to be a-sexual, sexually inactive or else, that their sexuality and fertility should be controlled” (emphasis added) at manuscript 8) [Sabatello, “Disability, Human Rights and Global Health”], Compare Doug Jones, “Domestic Violence Against Women With Disabilities: A Feminist Legal Theory Analysis” (2007) 2:1 Florida A&M University Law Review 207 (“[perhaps the most significant myth is that women with disabilities are asexual” at 223); Andreas Dimopoulos, “Let’s Misbehave: Intellectual Disability and Capacity to Consent to Sex” (paper delivered at the Society of Legal Scholars, Faculty of Law, Brunel University, 1 September 2012), online: SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract-2332259> (discussing the “social stereotype for persons with intellectual disability that they should not be having sex, that they should be asexual” at 9); Rangita de Silva de Alwis, “Mining the Intersections: Advancing the Rights of Women and Children With Disabilities Within an Interrelated Web of Human Rights” (2009) 18 Pac Rim L & Pol’y J 293 (women with disabilities are especially vulnerable to “the imposition of social stereotypes of asexuality and passivity” at 296), to Amy Spady, “The Sexual Freedom of Eve: A Recommendation for Contraceptive Sterilization Legislation in the Canadian Post Re Eve Context” (2008) 25 Windsor Rev Legal Soc Issues 33 (“[it] is accepted that many persons with mental disabilities experience the same, if not greater, sexual urges as other individuals” at 56).


sexual behaviour have remained firmly in place for centuries; perhaps the most famous characterization remains US Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s line in *Buck v Bell*, a case involving sterilization of a woman allegedly intellectually disabled: “[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough.” People with disabilities, simply put, are frequently stripped of their sexuality.

The ratification of the United Nations’ *Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities* (CRPD) demands that we reconsider this issue. In light of Convention Articles mandating, *inter alia*, “respect for inherent dignity,” the elimination of discrimination in all matters the director of a large German institution: “[s]exual expression is not a problem for people with cognitive disabilities – but for those who work with them” at 151).

2. 274 US 200 (1927).
3. *Ibid* at 207. The underpinnings of Holmes’ arguments are eviscerated and shredded in Paul A Lombardo, *Three Generations, No Imbeciles: Eugenics, the Supreme Court, and Buck v. Bell* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2008). Beyond the scope of this paper are the issues that are raised in what is known as “growth attenuation surgery” – when parents of young children with severe disabilities choose to have them undergo hysterectomies to avoid the onset of menstruation, mastectomies to prevent breast development, and the administration of high doses of estrogen to ensure that the children remain at a size that would facilitate care. See e.g. Alicia R Ouellette, “Growth Attenuation, Parental Choice, and the Rights of Disabled Children: Lessons from the Ashley X Case” (2008) 8:2 Houston Journal of Health Law and Policy 207 at 210-17 (discussing the “Ashley X” case); Ravi Malhotra & Katharine Neufeld, “The Legal Politics of Growth Attenuation” (2013) 34 Windsor Rev Legal Soc Issues 105.
related to interpersonal relationships, and services in the area of sexual and reproductive health, it is time for a radical change of perspective and attitude in how society views the sexuality, and right to express that sexuality, of persons with disabilities. Following the approach already adopted in international law, society as a whole must recognize that "[b]eing deemed a 'person' or sexual is not contingent upon ability." Yet, the literature surrounding the sexual autonomy and issues of sexuality that people with disabilities continue to confront remains remarkably silent on this issue in general, and totally silent about the issue we discuss in this paper: the CRPD's impact on the rights to sexual autonomy for persons institutionalized because of psychosocial or intellectual disability.

This subject is particularly nettlesome in light of another reality.

9. CRPD, supra note 7, Article 23.
12. On how the entire question is often seen as "taboo," see e.g. Michael L Perlin, "Make Promises by the Hour': Sex, Drugs, the ADA, and Psychiatric Hospitalization" (1997) 46:4 DePaul L Rev 947 [Perlin, "Promises by the Hour"] ["[t]he taboo and stigma attached to sexual behaviour is inevitably heightened when it is coupled with and conflated with stereotypes of the meaning of mental disability" at 965]; from a clinical perspective, see e.g. Eddie McCann, "The Expression of Sexuality in Persons with Psychosis: Breaking the Taboo" (2000) 32:1 Journal of Advanced Nursing 132 [McCann, "Breaking the Taboo"].
13. Special issues may be raised in cases of individuals with autism or those with autism spectrum disorders (ASD). Compare Laura Gilmour, Melike Schalomon & Veronica Smith, “Sexuality and ASD: Current State of Research” in Vanooed E Parel et al, eds, Comprehensive Guide to Autism (New York: Springer New York, 2014) 569 at 569 (people with ASD have sexual interests and engage in sexual behaviours with others), to Laura Gilmour, Melike Schalomon & Veronica Smith, “Sexuality in a Community Based Sample of Adults with Autism Spectrum Disorder” (2012) 6:1 Research in Autism Spectrum Disorders 313 (although individuals with ASD display an interest in sex and engage in sexual behaviours and showed no significant differences in breadth and strength of sexual behaviours and comprehension of sexual language when contrasted with non-ASD participants, nonetheless, a higher rate of asexuality was found among individuals with ASD).
One of the authors (MLP) has spent over 40 years involved with mental
disability law as a legal practitioner, advocate, academic and scholar. The
other author (AJL) has just embarked on her career as a lawyer on behalf
of these populations. Through our careers, one thing has been clear.
Nothing has ever touched as raw of a nerve as our discussion concerning
whether persons with mental disabilities have a right to voluntary sexual
interaction, especially when such individuals are institutionalized. Why
is this? And how does this relate to “sanism” – an irrational prejudice
of the same quality and character as other irrational prejudices that
cause and are reflected in prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism,
homophobia, and ethnic bigotry – that permeates all aspects of mental
disability law and affects all participants in the mental disability law
system: litigants, fact finders, counsel, and expert and lay witnesses.

Consider this conclusion:

Society tends to infantilize the sexual urges, desires, and needs of the
mentally disabled. Alternatively, they are regarded as possessing an animalistic
hypersexuality, which warrants the imposition of special protections and

14. For a discussion of hostile audience reaction to presentations about this
topic, see Michael L. Perlin, “‘Limited in Sex, They Dare’: Attitudes
Toward Issues of Patient Sexuality” (2005) 26:3 American Journal of
Forensic Psychiatry 25. Eddie McCann has speculated that this may
be because of a fear that simply addressing this issue “will be seen as
actively encouraging widespread institutional promiscuity”; see McCann,
“Breaking the Taboo”, supra note 12 at 133. On how institutionalization
may be a “compounding” problem in this context, see McCann “Breaking
the Taboo”, supra note 12 at 133.

15. The word “sanism” was, to the best of our knowledge, coined by Dr.
Morton Birnbaum. See Morton Birnbaum, “The Right to Treatment:
Some Comments on Its Development” in Frank Ayd, ed, Medical, Moral
and Legal Issues in Mental Health Care (Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins,
1974) 97 at 105; see also Kore v Califano, 573 F (2d) 761 at 764, n 12 (2d
Cir 1978). We believe it best explains the roots of our attitudes towards
persons with mental disabilities. See e.g. Michael L. Perlin, “‘Half-Wracked
Prejudice Leaped Forth’: Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental
Disability Law Developed as it Did” (1999) 10 J Contemp Legal Issues
3; see generally, e.g. Michael L Perlin, The Hidden Prejudice: Mental
Disability on Trial (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association,
2000).

16. On the way that sanism affects lawyers’ representation of clients, see
Michael L Perlin, “‘You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks’: Sanism in
limitations on their sexual behavior to stop them from acting on these “primitive” urges. By focusing on alleged “differentness,” we deny their basic humanity and their shared physical, emotional, and spiritual needs. By asserting that theirs is a primitive morality, we allow ourselves to censor their feelings and their actions. By denying their ability to show love and affection, we justify this disparate treatment.17

The foregoing observation may best explain the difficulty so many of us have in dealing with the question of the sexual autonomy of persons with disabilities, and explains why policymakers are often unable to approach such issues thoughtfully, even-handedly, and with clear heads. There is no question that Dr. Julie Tennille’s observation – “individuals with mental health conditions face additional obstacles to exploring their sexuality and forging satisfying intimate relationships”18 – must be “center stage” for this entire investigation. We must accept the reality that virtually all people are “sexual beings.”19

This paper will (1) briefly review the history of how significant legal and social issues regarding sexuality have been ignored and trivialized by legislators, policy makers, and the general public; (2) highlight those sections of the CRPD that force us to reconsider the scope of this issue; (3) offer some suggestions as to how ratifying and signatory states must change domestic policy so as to comport with CRPD mandates; and (4) consider the implications of therapeutic jurisprudence insights for the resolution of these issues.

The article title draws, in part, on Bob Dylan’s song Love Is Just a Four-Letter Word,20 a song that Dylan has never sung (although it remains

a frequent staple in Joan Baez’s repertoire). The standard “take” on the song is that it is “the bridge between his [Dylan’s] end-of-relationships blues and his giddy poetic streaks.” Yet, consider these lines in the context of the arguments we make in this paper:

She sat with a baby heavy on her knee
Yet spoke of life most free from slavery

and

To you I had no words to say
My experience was limited and underfed
You were talking while I hid

and

Drifting in and out of lifetimes
Unmentionable by name.

We believe that there is a deep “fit” between these lyrics, the song’s title, and the points we seek to make in this paper. Persons with disabilities seeking sexual autonomy are in a kind of emotional and physiological “slavery”; their experiences are certainly “limited and underfed,” and what they wish for is seen, by so many, as “unmentionable by name.” The idea that persons with disabilities can love and be loved is a “four letter word” to many. We use this lyric here to stress the sadness of that reality.

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II. How Sexuality Issues Have Been Treated by Law and Society

A. In Psychiatric Institutions

1. An Overview

Before we can analytically approach the question of whether institutionalized persons with mental disabilities have the right to engage in consensual sexual activity, we must attempt some modest deconstruction. No doctrinal or theoretical formulation can be seriously undertaken until we articulate our perspective. Are we looking for a legal answer, a clinical answer, a social answer, an administrative answer, or a behavioural answer (or, as we should, a combination of all of these)? Surely we must consider each area of analysis separately, and in concert with each other, if we wish to construct a meaningful, multi-textured, and comprehensive response.

2. What is Meant by “Sex”?

Twenty years ago, one of the authors (MLP) noted:

We must consider whether any of these answers depends upon our definition of sex. Do we need to consider every possible permutation of sexual behavior? Does it make a difference if we are discussing monogamous heterosexual sex, polygamous heterosexual sex, monogamous homosexual sex, polygamous homosexual sex, or bisexual sex? Does sex mean intercourse? What about oral sex? Anal sex? Masturbation? Voyeurism? Exhibitionism?

It probably makes sense, at the outset, to keep in mind that any consideration of the issues under discussion here must, at the least,

24. This section is largely adapted from Perlin, “Beyond the Last Frontier?”, supra note 17 at 522-28.

25. Perlin, “Beyond the Last Frontier?”, supra note 17 at 527, citing in part to Michael L. Commons et al, “Professionals’ Attitudes Towards Sex Between Institutionalized Patient” (1992) 46:4 American Journal of Psychotherapy 571 (discussing ways that mental health professionals’ attitudes towards sex are influenced by the nature of the sexual activity and the patients’ sexual orientation). See e.g. Stevens, supra note 11 (“[i]n the limited amount of cases where sexual activity is permitted, it is generally only heterosexual marital sex that is allowed” at 16).
take into account the realities that "sex" means much more than simply heterosexual intercourse. Although an exhaustive discussion of all permutations is not possible here, we will discuss briefly the question of sexual-contact-other-than-"standard"-intercourse, the surprisingly nettlesome issue of masturbation, and the most controversial question of compensated sexual assistance.

i. Other kinds of Sex

A recent article about a civil law suit that followed litigation over a long-term relationship between a man with a psychosocial disability (schizophrenia) and a priest with AIDS — questions whether sex can be ordered like a "Guttman scale," involving a "unidimensional behavioral hierarchy from French kissing to penetrative intercourse," and wonders if "someone has consented to touching genitals over clothing ... implies consent to French kissing," asking whether "consent to one step automatically insures consent to others below it?" This article does not begin to answer the preceding question, but the perspective of ordering is raised here to clarify that sex and sexual activities are not "unidimensional" questions, and that policymakers should be aware of the complexity of these issues.

With non-normative sexual behaviour (including sexual activities engaged in with and without a partner) come other discriminatory beliefs by the majority of society that sub-cultures practicing such behaviours are "different" and "abnormal." While there are many variations of sexual behaviour, we will briefly examine the issues surrounding masturbation.


28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.
and sexual surrogates, since some amount of research has been done in evaluating their impact on the community of persons with disabilities.

ii. Masturbation

Although at least one study has found that staff workers at a medium-security facility for persons with intellectual disabilities generally held “liberal attitudes” toward masturbation, and another article has called for “masturbation training,” much controversy swirls around the question of facilitated masturbation and the role of the caregiver in the facilitation process. It goes without saying that this is an issue that must

30. On the roots of the 19th century view that masturbation was a cause of mental disorder, see EH Hare, “Masturbatory Insanity: The History of an Idea” (1962) 108 Journal of Mental Science 1.


be subject to discussion in an “open and value-free environment.”

iii. Care Workers

Perhaps the most controversial question – in a sea of controversial questions – is the appropriateness of using care workers as sexual surrogates in cases involving persons with disabilities. Such surrogacy can involve masturbation or intercourse. Several European nations – including The Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, and Switzerland – allow “limited ‘touching’ services for [persons with severe disabilities] through non-profit organizations.” Elsewhere, there are organizations in Canada, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand, that, in the words of the Australian-based Touching Base website, “developed out of the need to assist people with disability and sex workers to connect with each other, focusing on access, discrimination, human rights and legal issues and the attitudinal barriers that these two marginalised communities can face.”

An administrative decision in Denmark has approved the payment of social welfare funding for an “escort girl” as a “handicap benefit.”

It has been suggested by one medical ethicist that “jurisdictions that

34. Clive Glass & Bakulesh Soni, “Sexual Problems of Disabled Patients” (1999) 318:7182 British Medical Journal 518. At least one academic consideration of the issue has noted that, concern within services often returns to the question of “whether such interventions, if successful, will then lead to the person spending too much time masturbating, as they may have learnt how to do it well and effectively,” see Cambridge, Carnaby & McCarthy, supra note 32 at 260.
35. See online: Touching Base Inc <http://www.touchingbase.org/>.
37. See online: EASE Canada <http://easecanada.org/>.
41. See Touching Base, supra note 35.
42. See email from Professor Kirsten Ketscher, WELMA – Centre for Legal Studies in Welfare and Market, Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen (30 December 2013) (discussing the decision in Escort Girl C-106 Danish Social Appeals Board).
prohibit prostitution should carve out narrow exceptions for individuals whose physical or mental disabilities make sexual relationships with non-compensated adults either impossible or highly unlikely. Although there is at least one report of this having been done using Social Security funds in the USA, it is clearly an idea that has not gained significant traction in that jurisdiction. In fact, any such use of sexual surrogacy has been sharply criticized as “distort[ing] sympathies for the situations of people with disabilities to promote prostitution.”

This question, out of all those that arise when looking at sexual autonomy for persons with disabilities, is compounded by societal views about prostitution, exacerbated by the often-sanist thinking about the sexual needs of persons with disabilities. It is not surprising to see that nations that have legalized the profession of sex worker are more likely to have opportunities for sexual surrogacy. These nations are allowing some of the stigma surrounding sex (and in particular, sex for people with disabilities) to be lifted, leading to a more honest discussion about meeting the basic needs of people, including the need for sex.

Sexual surrogacy also challenges society to imagine that a non-disabled person would be willing to engage in sexual activity with a disabled person. Entrenched sanism and long-standing fear of “contamination” or

44. See David J Lillesand & Gina M Nguyen, SSI Trust and Transfer Rules, 17 NAELA Q 3 (Spring 2004) (recounting case where a “sympathetic sister/trustee purchased ‘entertainment services,’ consisting of nursing home visits by ‘escort services’ personnel to the nursing home where her severely disabled and dying brother resided”).
47. See e.g. The Legal Status of Prostitution by Country, online: Charts Bin <http://chartsbin.com/view/snb> (listing nations in which sex work is legal, overlapping in a large part with nations in which surrogates may be used, as discussed in supra notes 35–42 and accompanying text).
disability as a “contagion” also make this concept a difficult one to grasp for many who may be confronted with this form of sexuality. 48

Although surrogacy is not identical to engaging in an emotional relationship in which sex is a component, it is yet another option for people with disabilities to gain some autonomy in their decision making about their own needs. Under the CRPD, they have the same right to engage in sex that non-disabled people do, and surrogacy may afford an opportunity to those people who are, for many reasons, unable to or uninterested in engaging in a non-surrogate sexual relationship.

The differences between nations’ views on the “acceptability” of masturbation and sexual surrogacy are also indicative of those nations’ dominant norms and values. Professor Elaine Craig has discussed the danger of regulating activity based on the dominant norms of a society, stating that if legal standards are applied based only on dominant belief systems, they “[privilege] dominant social, cultural and religious practices.” 49 Further, in the context of consent laws, she notes that “[s]ocial approval is not an equitable basis upon which to criminalize particular sexual activities.” 50 Although the disability rights movement has made great strides, persons with disabilities continue to remain a minority group, rather than a part of the dominant culture in most nations. 51 Their

49. See CRPD, supra note 7, Article 23 (discussed in this context, see text accompanying note 103).
51. Ibid.
rights and needs may not be legislated away by that dominant culture because majority populations believe sexual activities of persons with disabilities do not produce "socially desirable cultural products."55

B. Current Laws Relating to Sexual Autonomy of Persons with Disabilities

As noted previously, discussion of sexual autonomy relating to persons with disabilities are few and far between in scholarly journals. In the United States, the law has followed this trend, with very little attention paid to the legal rights of persons with disabilities to exercise their autonomy, especially in an institutional setting. Many critical questions remain unanswered in the law, leaving hospitals and community treatment facilities to decide for themselves how to best deal with these issues. Often, these decisions are made with no clear guidelines and carried out on a case-by-case basis. Remarkably, none of the respondents questioned in a British study were even aware that they had any "sexual rights."54 And we virtually never consider the argument posited by the medical ethicist Jacob Appel in this context that sexual pleasure is a fundamental human right.55

The United States Supreme Court, federal district courts, and state courts have all addressed the range of constitutional rights held by involuntarily committed individuals, such as the right to counsel,56

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53. Craig, supra note 50 at 117.
55. Appel, supra note 36 at 154. See also Stevens, supra note 11 ("[p]oliticizing sexual pleasure and oppression of disabled people through enacting cripsex is a powerful way to affirm our humanity," where author defines "cripsex" to "express the political nature of the sexuality of disabled people" at 16). Compare Di Nucci, supra note 43 at 160 (responding to Appel, and disagreeing with this thesis, in large part, because, if Appel's theory was to be adopted, "we would end up with a situation in which severely disabled people have their sexual satisfaction paid for them by the state, while everybody else will have to pay for it, or go through the trouble of finding willing non-compensated sexual partners").
56. In the matter of the Mental Health of KGF, 29 P (3d) 485 at 491 (Mont Sup Ct 2001).
the right to refuse medication,\textsuperscript{57} and the right to be treated in the least restrictive environment,\textsuperscript{58} to name but a few.\textsuperscript{59} The number of cases litigated by persons with disabilities has grown exponentially since the 1970s.\textsuperscript{60} However, the right to sexual autonomy has remained an elusive topic, with very few references to it in any major state or federal court decision involving persons with disabilities.\textsuperscript{61} Legislation has also failed to adequately address issues of sexual autonomy both in and out of mental health facilities. A case may be made for regulations or laws allowing sexual activity in certain settings based on domestic disability anti-discrimination laws. If sexual activity is banned for no other reason than the “disabled” status of the consenting adults wishing to engage in such activity, it may be argued that this sort of \textit{per se} discrimination violates the \textit{Americans with Disabilities Act} or other similar pieces of legislation.\textsuperscript{62}

\textbf{C. The Effects of Institutionalization on Persons with Disabilities and Sexual Autonomy}

Next, we must consider the practical implications of sexual relationships in a closed institution like a psychiatric hospital.\textsuperscript{63} Under the best of

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{57} \textit{Riggins v Nevada,} 504 US 127 (1992).
\item \textsuperscript{58} \textit{Olmstead v L.C.,} 527 US 581 (1999).
\item \textsuperscript{59} The broad range of topics also includes competency evaluations for mentally ill criminal defendants (\textit{Dusky v United States,} 362 US 402 (1960); \textit{Drope v Missouri,} 420 US 162 (1975); \textit{Pate v Robinson,} 383 US 375 (1966); illegality of indefinite confinement of persons found incompetent to stand trial (\textit{Jackson v Indiana,} 406 US 715 (1972)); prisoners’ rights (\textit{Estelle v Gamble,} 429 US 97 (1976); \textit{Washington v Harper,} 494 US 210 (1990)); the civil commitment process (\textit{Addington v Texas,} 441 US 418 (1979)); and rights of civilly committed patients (\textit{Youngberg v Romeo,} 457 US 307 (1982); \textit{O’Connor v Donaldson,} 422 US 563 (1975)).
\item \textsuperscript{60} See Michael L Perlin, \textit{Mental Disability Law: Civil and Criminal,} 2d ed, vol 1 (Charlottesville, VA: Lexis Law Publishing, 1998) at § 1-1, 1 [Perlin, \textit{Mental Disability Law} (discussing the “astonishing development of mental disability litigation” over past decades)].
\item \textsuperscript{61} But see \textit{Foy v Greenblatt,} 190 Cal Rptr 84 (Ct App 1983) discussed below and notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{62} See generally Perlin, “Promises by the Hour”, \textit{supra} note 12.
\item \textsuperscript{63} On the issues of sexual autonomy in forensic facilities in general, see
\end{itemize}
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circumstances, entering into a new sexual relationship can be stressful and confusing. Are these stresses “inappropriately” exacerbated when the universe in question is that of institutionalized mental patients? To what extent should the differing stress management abilities of institutionalized individuals be factored into any policy ultimately adopted? Conversely, can preoccupation with sex systemically distort all matters involving ward behaviour? How does this focus affect questions of individual versus group needs? Might an excessive concern with sex blunt the consideration of other related issues, such as self-esteem, the importance of developing a full range of interpersonal relationships, and the ability to deal with intimacy? We impose significant barriers that prevent institutionalized persons with mental disabilities from establishing intimacy. Yet, one study showed that most patients in high-security hospitals “valued being in a caring relationship [while] in the hospital,” and that there was likely “an ongoing desire for intimacy regardless of gender, diagnosis or offense group.”

A closed institution, by its nature, places substantial limits on individuals’ mobility and freedom of action. In considering how best to allow individuals to express their autonomy, it is important to consider all aspects of a relationship, including issues indirectly raised by sexual intimacy. For example, when people in the “free world” terminate a

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64. On the “false assumptions” made by many care providers about the “fundamental importance of intimacy to consumer well-being,” see Tennille & Wright, supra note 18 at 5.


66. Ibid.
stormy love affair, frequently they can adjust their lives so as not to have much contact with their former lovers. What happens if that ex-lover lives on the same floor of an inpatient hospital (especially if it is a locked ward hospital), and neither patient can leave without a court order? Conversely, what happens when a couple is split up by a court order transferring one patient to another ward or facility for clinical or legal reasons? These are decisions that must be considered in order to allow individuals confined in an institution the ability to engage in a relationship just as they would in the “free world.” Although an institution may need to restrict some privileges based on safety or treatment concerns, it will be critical for institutions to consider a “least restrictive environment” approach when dealing with patients’ sexual autonomy, as it is undoubtedly part of their rights under the CRPD.

Another series of issues to consider comes from differences in the status of institutionalized persons. Those institutionalized after being civilly committed, ordered confined for a competency evaluation, or held in a locked facility after a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity each have rights and aspects of law that are unique to each particular status. Assuming the individuals wishing to engage in sexual activity are competent to consent, are all patients to be treated in the same way, or are there differences between voluntarily and involuntarily committed

67. This is made more complicated by decisions such as Kulak v City of New York, 88 F.3d 63 at 73 (2d Cir 1996) (no liberty interest created by court recommendation that mental hospital transfer involuntarily-committed patient to less restrictive environment because transfer was not mandatory).

68. See e.g. Michael L Perlin, “‘Too Stubborn To Ever Be Governed By Enforced Insanity’: Some Therapeutic Jurisprudence Dilemmas in the Representation of Criminal Defendants in Incompetency and Insanity Cases” (2010) 33:5-6 Int’l J L & Psychiatry 475 at 480 (discussing significance of patients’ “litigational status” on questions involving right to refuse treatment).

69. The topic of competency to consent to sexual activities in a psychiatric institution is an extremely complex topic that should be addressed separately, in great depth. See generally Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “All His Sexless Patients: Persons with Mental Disabilities and the Competence to Have Sex” (2014) 89:2 Wash. L. Rev. 257 (Perlin, “All His Sexless Patients”). For the purposes of this paper, the authors choose to assume the individuals discussed are legally competent to consent.
patients that are relevant to this inquiry? Further, should involuntary commitment implicitly restrict one's freedom to engage in sexual activity? Is it justifiable, or even legally required, to place different restrictions on patients who have been committed following their involvement in the criminal justice system, in comparison to those imposed on civilly committed patients? If competency to consent is not at issue, disallowing sexual activity solely based on legal status appears punitive, rather than therapeutic.

Ultimately, the lingering question when considering sexual autonomy of institutionalized persons is, in any event, can patients be stopped from having sex?

D. Clinical Questions Regarding Sexual Autonomy of Persons with Disabilities

Next, we must consider clinical questions. A patient’s treatment team is charged with finding the most therapeutic treatment in the least restrictive environment. For many patients, this involves therapy intended to help them transition back to living in the “real world.” That can include behavioural therapy and group programs that encourage social interaction. Questions of sexual autonomy should also be considered within that context in developing and assessing a treatment plan and long-term goals for a patient both in and out of a treatment facility. For example, clinicians should note whether the patient in question ever expressed any wish to engage in sexual activity, and then discuss whether it is clinically beneficial or anti-therapeutic to allow institutionalized patients autonomy in sexual decision-making. In answering this question, to what extent should clinicians consider research on the therapeutic value of touching and physical intimacy?

70. On how interpersonal relationships among patients can help further treatment goals, see Edmund G Doherty, “Social Attraction and Choice Among Psychiatric Patients and Staff: A Review” (1971) 12:4 Journal of Health & Social Behavior 279 at 287. See also Stevens, supra note 11 (“[r]ecognition and expression of sexual autonomy has many health benefits, including analgesic effects, hypertension reduction, and increased relaxation” at 23).

71. See McCann, “Breaking the Taboo”, supra note 12 (quoting patient,
hospitalization affect the restrictions placed on their sexual autonomy? If so, how?28 What is the impact of sexual activity on different methods of treatment? On the overall ward milieu? What correlative responsibilities come with the assertion of rights?29 These questions also lead to a consideration of patient sexual autonomy from the perspective of hospital officials, and the reasons for their discomfort with the subject. Why are hospital administrators resistant to expanded sexual activity on the part of patients? Is it more than simple inconvenience, or even the fear of unwanted pregnancies? How much does a fear of a potential hospital-wide AIDS epidemic contribute to this resistance?29 How realistic and genuine is this fear? The expansion of provider liability is the source of realistic concerns on the part of therapists that an ever-expanding range of clinical decisions may lead to ever-expanding personal liability.25 One commentator has suggested that the threat of litigation has led hospital administrators to responding to survey question on the meaning of intimacy: “[s]ex, love, caring, and sharing ... things like that” [emphasis added] at 136).

There has been academic literature available about this for over 40 years, though it is rarely cited in the legal literature. See e.g. Ashley Montagu, *Touching: The Human Significance of Skin*, 2d ed (USA: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971); Harry F Harlow, Margaret K Harlow & Stephen J Suomi, “From Thought to Therapy” (1971) 59:5 American Scientist 538. Professor Heather Ellis Cucolo has focused on this in her recent work on sex offenders. She asks why we fail to acknowledge that the concept of intimacy is “the key to preventing and minimizing re-offense.” See Heather Ellis Cucolo, “Right to Sex in the Treatment and Civil Commitment of Sexual Violent Predators” (2007) [unpublished, on file with authors]. This is a reality that must be considered as we further explore this issue.


“attempt to minimize the complexity of patient sexuality by focusing on the symbolic, simplistic reassurance of written procedures.” Was this response idiosyncratic to the circumstances at a particular hospital, or is this practice more common? Professor Bernadette McSherry and Professor Margaret Somerville note on this point:

> Even if a written policy on sexual activity is put in place, the fear of litigation by institution administrators may still lead to the “policing” of such activity in case some form of harm may be taking place. The threat of litigation may therefore lead to staff members erring on the side of caution in relation to sexual activity among those in institutions. 

E. Cultural Issues Surrounding Sexual Autonomy of Institutionalized Patients

The nature of this topic makes it, inevitably, a contentious point among the various groups that will debate it, legislate it, and implement it. Beliefs and values beyond law and legislation are intertwined with attitudes toward sexual activity. Culture, politics, religion, and senses of “morality” are all elements that must be addressed in order to realistically work through these difficult issues and come to a consensus on the proper way to address them. Even if policies are promulgated to protect and respect the sexual autonomy of institutionalized individuals, what happens when individual line staff at a hospital, the people to whom the implementation of the policy inevitably falls, simply refuse to cooperate with the policy because their own sense of religious “morality” forbids it? For example, their religion may teach that unmarried persons—

76. Terry Holbrook, “Policing Sexuality in a Modern State Hospital” (1989) 40:1 Hospital & Community Psychiatry 75 at 79 (discussing the results of a psychiatric hospital’s failure to notify the police of the sexual assault of one patient by another).

77. Bernadette McSherry & Margaret A Somerville, “Sexual Activity Among Institutionalized Persons in Need of Special Care” (1998) 16 Windsor YB Access Just 90 at 124. On how the avoidance of anticipated prospective harm has become central to much of disability law policy in this area, see generally Dimopoulos, supra note 1 (Dimopoulos argues that, “[b]y seeking to avoid harm to self we are perpetuating oppressive social and legal responses which presented persons with disabilities as asexual, or worse still, as individuals who should be asexual” at 8).

78. In general, on the significance of care provider discomfort around sexual
any mental capacity — should not have sex, or that married persons — of any mental capacity — should not have extramarital sex. Is it justifiable for private facilities that are church-affiliated, or private nonsectarian facilities that retain units specially designated for practitioners of specific religions, to apply different restrictions in these areas?  

F. Conclusion

The issues discussed above should underscore the point that this topic is complex and under-considered in the literature and laws regarding persons with disabilities. These complexities are compounded by society’s generally irrational attitudes towards persons with mental disabilities. The lack of attention, litigation, and commentary on this subject appears anomalous. Institutionalized persons self-evidently do not lose their sexuality or sexual desires when they lose their liberty. There is some added irony to be found in the fact that litigation over antipsychotic medication refusal — the most contentious aspect of institutionalized patients’ rights law — centers on drug side effects, and the loss of sexual desire is one of the most highly-noted amongst them. Thus, the law

expression by persons with mental disabilities, see Tennille & Wright, supra note 18 at 8-9.

79. *Ibid* (“faith-based provider services … often care for consumers who do not share the same religious traditions or spiritual beliefs about expressions of sexuality” at 11).


81. See Tom Koch, “The Ideology of Normalcy: The Ethics of Difference” (2005) 16:2 Journal of Disability Policy Studies 123 at 125 (individuals with disabilities are thought to be “different” by society. The ideology of normalcy, which applies to issues facing individual with disabilities, is based on the idea that “persons of difference necessarily possess a diminished level of personhood” which extends to every aspect of their daily lives).

82. The loss of sexual desire as a side effect to be considered in determining the scope of patients’ right to refuse treatment is weighed in, *inter alia*, *In re Orr*, 531 N E (2d) 64 at 74 (Ill App Ct 1988); *In re Roe*, 421 N E (2d) 40 at 54 (Mass Sup Ct 1981); *Jarvis v Levine*, 418 N W (2d) 139 at 145-46 (Minn Sup Ct 1988). See also Tennille & Wright, supra note 18 (“beyond having difficulty merely meeting someone interesting with whom to become sexually intimate, an important part of the story for many consumers is the frustrating sexual dysfunction
acknowledges that sexual desire of a person in need of medication is a sufficiently important personal trait so that its diminution must be weighed into the formulation of a medication refusal policy. Yet the law simultaneously denies patients the power and importance of sexual desire with respect to hospital ward life.  

Most states do not recognize a patient’s right to personal or interpersonal sexual relationships. In practice, a patient’s right to sexual interaction often depends on the whim of line-level staff or on whether such interaction is seen as a feature of the patient’s treatment plan. It has even been suggested that “sexual activity between psychiatric inpatients should be strictly prohibited and when it occurs patients should be isolated … and tranquilized if necessary.” One hospital’s guidelines counsel patients as follows: “[i]f you develop a relationship with another patient, staff will get together with you to help decide whether this relationship is beneficial or detrimental to you.”

Hospital staff are often hostile to the idea that patients may be sexually active in any way. 

However, many institutional mental health professionals and

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83. On the ways that the stigma of mental illness increases isolation, and its impact on sexual behaviour and autonomy, see Eric Wright et al, “Stigma and the Sexual Isolation of People with Serious Mental Illness” (2007) 54:1 Social Problems 78. On how neglecting consumer sexuality issues reinforces stigma, see Tennille & Wright, supra note 18 at 13.


85. Gabor Keitner & Paul Grof, “Sexual and Emotional Intimacy Between Psychiatric Inpatients: Formulating a Policy” (1981) 32:3 Hospital & Community Psychiatry 188 at 193. See also Tennille and Wright, supra note 18 at 9 (discussing false belief of care providers that “[i]t is the providers’ role to protect consumers from romantic rejection”).

86. See e.g. Rogers v Okein, 478 F Supp 1342 at 1373-74 (Mass D 1979) (noting that patients are secluded for engaging in sexual behaviour).
behaviourists now recognize that patients “are and wish to be sexually active,” and that sexual freedom often has therapeutic value. Writing about this recently, Andreas Dimopoulos has argued forcefully that, “[b]y seeking to avoid harm to self we are perpetuating oppressive social and legal responses which presented persons with disabilities as asexual, or worse still, as individuals who should be asexual.”

Others call attention to our societal obligation to provide family planning assistance to women institutionalized in psychiatric hospitals. Nonetheless, many hospitals remain reluctant to promulgate such policies. This is not surprising, given the aforementioned paucity of legal authority requiring them to do so. Moreover, there is a near complete lack of literature generally available to guide hospitals and their staff, should they even desire to formulate such procedures.

There is little case law on the questions addressed in this paper. Of the few litigated cases, the most important is *Foy v Greenblott*. There, an institutionalized patient and her infant child (conceived and born while

88. Binder, *supra* note 84 at 122.
89. Dimopoulos, *supra* note 1 at 8.
91. 190 Cal Rptr 84 (Ct App 1983) [*Foy*]. See generally Perlin, “Make Promises by the Hour”, *supra* note 12 at 966-67.
the mother was a patient in a locked psychiatric ward) sued the mother's treating doctor for his failure to either maintain proper supervision over her so as to prevent her from having sex or to provide her with contraceptive devices and/or sexual counseling.92

The Court rejected the plaintiff's claims of improper supervision, finding that institutionalized patients had a right to engage in voluntary sexual relations as an aspect of either the “least restrictive environment” or “reasonably non-restrictive confinement conditions” and that that right (to less or reasonably non-restrictive confinement) included suitable opportunities for the patient's interactions with members of the opposite sex.93 On the other hand, the Court did characterize the defendant's failure to provide the plaintiff with contraceptive devices and counseling as a deprivation of her right to reproductive choice.94 It also rejected a claim for “wrongful birth” by the infant child, concluding that “[o]ur society has repudiated the proposition that mental patients will necessarily beget unhealthy, inferior or otherwise undesirable children if permitted to reproduce.”95

While Foy has been applauded as “a model exposition of the reproductive rights of institutionalized women,”96 it is an isolated case. A reading of the case law reveals that this area simply does not exist as an active area of patients' rights litigation.97

92. Foy, ibid at 87.
93. Ibid at 90, n 2.
94. Ibid at 91-92.
95. Ibid at 93.
97. See Perlin, Mental Disability Law, supra note 60 at § 3C-5.1, 416-21 (reviewing developments). See also Dimopoulos, supra note 1, discussing – and sharply criticizing – recent British cases of A Local Authority v H [2012] EWHC 49 (COP), and D Borough Council v AB [2011] EWHC 101 (COP), both of which concluded that individuals with intellectual disabilities did not have the capacity to consent to sexual interaction. A recent case in Israel has found that a person with schizophrenia has a right to family, and that sperm retrieval for this purpose is allowed. See Ploni v Israel Legal Attorney, Case # 6036-10-08 (Haifa Family Ct, 29 Dec 2013) (decision, in Hebrew, and explanatory email from Dr. Maya Sabatello, on file with authors).
At the same time, there is little in the way of legislation. By way of example, although many American jurisdictions have enacted "patients' bills of rights" providing a broad array of civil rights and liberties for persons institutionalized in psychiatric hospitals, only a few jurisdictions mandate a limited right to sexual interaction. 98

In general, the lack of statutory authority and case law logically leads to the next question: since we are, by all accounts, a fairly litigious group of people, why not? Why hasn't this area — one that deals with the most personal of rights 99 — been the subject of greater scrutiny or of court decrees (or even of substantial scholarly writings)? 100 Although there has

98. See e.g. Ohio Rev Code, § 5122.29(I) ("[t]he right to social interaction with members of either sex, subject to adequate supervision, unless such social interaction is specifically withheld under a patient's written treatment plan for clear treatment reasons."); Mont Code Ann, § 53-21-142(10) ("[p]atients have the right to be provided, with adequate supervision, suitable opportunities for interaction with members of the opposite sex except to the extent that a professional person in charge of the patient's treatment plan writes an order stating that the interaction is inappropriate to the treatment regimen."); NJ Stat Ann, § 30:4-24.2(10) ("[p]atients have the right to suitable opportunities for interaction with members of the opposite sex, with adequate supervision").

99. This is especially ironic in that we acknowledge the significance of sexual autonomy in other related areas of law, but ignore it here, see Perlin, "Beyond the Last Frontier?", supra note 17 ("the law acknowledges that sexual desire is a sufficiently important personal trait so that its diminution must be weighed into the formulation of a medication refusal policy. Yet the law simultaneously denies the power and importance of sexual desire with respect to hospital ward life" at 531).

100. There are remarkably few modern law review articles on the global issue of mental patient sexuality published in the US. See e.g. Winniare Sy, "The Right of Institutionalized Disabled Patients to Engage in Consensual Sexual Activity" (2001) 23:2 Whittier Law Review 545; and Evelyn M Tenenbaum, "To Be or to Exist: Standards for Deciding Whether Dementia Patients in Nursing Homes Should Engage in Intimacy, Sex, and Adultery" (2009) 42:3 Ind L Rev 675. See also, discussing Professor Tenenbaum's work, J Richard Lindsay, "The Need for More Specific Legislation in Sexual Consent Capacity Assessments for Nursing Home Residents" (2010) 31:3 J Legal Med 303 at 306. For a transnational perspective, see Hella von Unger, "The Meaning and Management of Women's Sexuality in Psychiatric vs. Community Psychiatric Settings in Berlin, Germany" (Paper delivered at the Thirtieth International Congress on Law and Mental Health, in Padua, Italy, 26 June 2007), [unpublished,
been attention paid to this issue in nursing and psychiatric literature,\textsuperscript{101} there has been virtually no “carryover” to the question of the legal implications of the policies for clinicians (or lack of policies).\textsuperscript{102} And, of course, our attitudes exhibit willful blindness to the reality that patients are – and likely always have been – sexually active.\textsuperscript{103}

We also need to consider how we set priorities in defining the underlying question of how we, as a society, can restructure our laws regarding the autonomy of individuals with disabilities to engage in sexual activities of their choice. What do we look at first: autonomy rights, civil libertarian concerns, due process requirements, privacy interests, competency criteria, clinical needs, therapeutic jurisprudential concerns, tort liability worries, voluntariness constructs, or the immutable fact that sexual interaction, by its very description, entails the participation of more than one individual? No resolution of the underlying issues can be contemplated unless we distinguish these approaches and carefully

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\textsuperscript{102} See Perlin, “Beyond the Last Frontier?”, supra note 17 (“many hospitals remain reluctant to promulgate such policies” at 532); but compare Dobal & Torkelson, supra note 101 at 68 (60% of psychiatric facilities polled reported having such policies).

\textsuperscript{103} Perlin, “Beyond the Last Frontier?”, supra note 17 at 532; Welch et al, supra note 87 at 855. See Susan Stefan, "Joshua's Children: Constitutional Responsibility for Institutionalized Persons after Deshaney v. Winnebago County" (2013) 70:1 Wash & Lee L Rev 793 (“[s]exual activity in institutional settings is more common than outsiders might imagine, and runs that gamut from mutual and supportive relationships between patients through exploitation, coercion, and rape by other patients and staff” at 800).
articulate their interrelationships, their potential conflicts, and their relative values as competing social choices. In short, this is a very difficult project.

III. Other Approaches

A. International Human Rights

Scholars have begun in recent years to focus more carefully and thoughtfully on the relationship between mental disability law and international human rights law. In our own writing, we have explored this connection in the context of forensic facility conditions, correctional law, appointment of counsel, psychological evaluations in criminal cases, and how the law shames and humiliates persons with mental disabilities.


We believe that the ratification of the *Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities* demands that society and legislators alike reconsider this entire issue. First, the CRPD mandates nations to "[p]rovide persons with disabilities with the same range, quality and standard of free or affordable health care and programmes as provided to other persons, including in the area of sexual and reproductive health and population-based public health programmes."\(^{106}\) Beyond that, the other Convention Articles referred to above speak to dignity, the absence of discrimination, and the provision of sexual/reproductive health services.\(^{107}\) The Convention goes further than most legislation and court decisions, directly addressing not only the freedom to engage in sex, but outcomes of sexual activity, by codifying the disabled person's right to form a family, right to information and services for sexual health, and notably, the right to "retain their fertility on an equal basis with others."\(^{108}\) Yet, even given the specific and detailed language of the CRPD, the literature has been remarkably silent on these issues in general, especially as they relate to the CRPD's impact on the rights of persons institutionalized due to psychosocial or intellectual disability, to sexual autonomy.\(^{109}\) This

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63; Michael L Perlin & Naomi Weinstein, ““Friend to the Martyr, a Friend to the Woman of Shame': Thinking About The Law, Shame and Humiliation” (2014) Southern California Review of Law and Social Justice [in press].

106. CRPD, supra note 7, Article 25.

107. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.

108. CRPD, supra note 7, Article 23.

takes on even more significance when we consider how, in at least one CRPD signatory nation (China), the prevailing governmental policy is to prevent “pre-birth disabilities” via compelled abortion.110

Three scholarly articles in the literature stand out as lone examples of what scholars should focus their attentions on: (1) Maya Sabatello’s paper on the intersection between infertility, reproductive technologies and disability rights law;111 (2) Sabatello’s paper on how sexuality was considered in the debate on the CRPD;112 and (3) most directly, Marta Schaaf’s article on sexuality in the context of the CRPD.113 Drawing on
Articles 2 (one of the “reasonable accommodation” articles), 23, and 26, Sabatello concludes that the CRPD provides a “possible venue to further advance a right to found a family through “assisted reproductive technologies.” In assessing the drafting process, Sabatello notes how all conversations about sexuality “raised acute debates,” and that, as a result, sexuality per se “was not elevated to a right.” Schaaf – who frontally notes that disabled sexuality is often perceived as a “threat to others” – discussed the “tension” that underlay the negotiations leading to the adoption of the CRPD “between efforts to promote sexual rights and efforts to protect PWDs [persons with disabilities] from unwanted sterilization.” Further, Schaaf notes that disability-focused NGOs “continue to be reluctant to engage sexuality,” but concludes that “[s]exual rights as a rubric of rights’ claiming will likely continue to grow, providing greater and better opportunities to move beyond current understandings of sexual citizenship to include disabled and all other bodies.

Professor Michael Stein and Professor Janet Lord have written eloquently about how another Article in the convention – Article 30, setting out social rights of participation in cultural life – “serves as a vital channel of engagement with society when such participation is embraced by the community,” and increases “self-reliance and empowerment.”

116. Ibid at manuscript 25. On the opposition of the Arab Group of nations, the Holy See and Yemen to expanded mention of sexuality – unmoored from traditional marriage – see ibid at manuscript 23-24.
117. Schaaf, supra note 113 at 114.
118. Ibid at 124.
119. Ibid.
120. Ibid at 125.
Other commentators have concluded that the Convention “is regarded as having finally empowered the ‘world’s largest minority’ to claim their rights, and to participate in international and national affairs on an equal basis with other minority groups who have achieved specific treaty recognition and protection.”

The CRPD Committee has already begun to outline legislation and policies required to ensure implementation, a process that may prove useful in addressing the many unanswered questions posed in this paper. The Committee has worked on issuing recommendations for services and programs aimed at people with disabilities to assist them in informed decision-making, regardless of whether they are institutionalized or not. These programs would work on mainstreaming disability issues into legislation, and disseminating information about sexual and reproductive health in an accessible format for individuals who want to become informed about their right to engage in sexual activity. Further, the Committee supports teaching sexual health to children with intellectual disabilities.

If the Convention is taken seriously – if it is, in fact, more than


124. Girlescu, supra note 3 at 21; Guidelines on Treaty-Specific Document, ibid at 123.

a “paper victory”126 — then, perhaps, it can be a vehicle to uproot that aspect of sanism that continues to deny the institutionalized persons the rights to their own sexuality.127 Throughout the CRPD, it is apparent that the preferences and decisions of persons with disabilities must be respected and promoted. Expanding on this idea of self-determination, it follows that decisions about sex, sexuality, and reproduction are to be made by the person with a disability, rather than a “caretaker” or a facility superintendent. This kind of decision-making is a core element of self-determination and empowerment that is promoted by the CRPD.128 However, in order to bring about such a dramatic shift in thinking (and translating that to concrete action which will allow for such decisions to be made by persons with disabilities) on this issue, it is necessary that other scholars follow the lead of Professors Sabatello and Schaaf to


127. There is some evidence that in other jurisdictions, parallel rights are being taken seriously. See e.g. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols No. 11 and No. 14, Nov. 1, Art 8(1), online: Council of Europe <http://conventions.coe.int/>; as construed in X v Iceland, (1976) 5 DR 86 at 87 (Article 8 prohibiting public authorities from interfering with a person’s right “to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence” is broad enough to encompass an entitlement “to establish and to develop relationships with other human beings, especially in the emotional field for the development and fulfillment of one’s own personality”). This issue is discussed in Lawrence O Gostin & Lance Gable, “The Human Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities: A Global Perspective on the Application of Human Rights Principles to Mental Health” (2004) 63:1 Md L Rev 20 at 94.

128. Girlescu, supra note 3 at 19.
seriously engage this topic.129

B. **Therapeutic Jurisprudence**

Another important lens through which to view this issue is that of therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ). Therapeutic jurisprudence “asks us to look at law as it actually impacts people’s lives”130 and focuses on the law’s influence on emotional life and psychological well-being.131 It suggests that “law should value psychological health, should strive to avoid imposing anti-therapeutic consequences whenever possible, and when consistent with other values served by law, should attempt to bring about healing and wellness.”132 The ultimate aim of therapeutic jurisprudence is to determine whether legal rules, procedures, and lawyers’ roles can or should be reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential, while refraining from subordination of due process principles.133 There is an

129. See e.g. Willene Holness, “Informed Consent for Sterilisation of Women and Girls with Disabilities in the Light of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities” (2013) 27:4 Agenda: Empowering Women for Gender Equity 35 (questioning whether South Africa’s sterilization law meets the requirements of the CRPD, and concluding that the enhancement of the decision-making capacities of the population in question will require “demystifying the sexuality of women with disabilities”). On how sexual health for persons with intellectual disabilities is a rights issue under the CRPD, see Foley & Kelly, supra note 31 at 20.


inherent tension in this inquiry, but David Wexler clearly identifies how it must be resolved: the law’s use of “mental health information to improve therapeutic functioning [cannot] impinge upon justice concerns.”134 As one of the authors (MLP) has written elsewhere, “an inquiry into therapeutic outcomes does not mean that therapeutic concerns ‘trump’ civil rights and civil liberties.”135 In its aim to use the law to empower individuals, enhance rights, and promote well-being, TJ has been described as “a sea-change in ethical thinking about the role of law … a movement towards a more distinctly relational approach to the practice of law … which emphasises psychological wellness over adversarial triumphalism.”136 That is, TJ supports an ethic of care.137

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137. See e.g. Winick & Wexler, supra note 136 at 605-07; David B Wexler, “Not Such a Party Pooper: An Attempt to Accommodate (Many of) Professor Quinn’s Concerns about Therapeutic Jurisprudence Criminal
One of the central principles of TJ is a commitment to dignity. Professor Amy Ronner describes the “three Vs” as voice, validation, and voluntariness, arguing:

What “the three Vs” commend is pretty basic: litigants must have a sense of voice or a chance to tell their story to a decision maker. If that litigant feels that the tribunal has genuinely listened to, heard, and taken seriously the litigant’s story, the litigant feels a sense of validation. When litigants emerge from a legal proceeding with a sense of voice and validation, they are more at peace with the outcome. Voice and validation create a sense of voluntary participation, one in which the litigant experiences the proceeding as less coercive. Specifically, the feeling on the part of litigants that they voluntarily partook in the very process that engendered the end result or the very judicial pronouncement that affects their own lives can initiate healing and bring about improved behavior in the future. In general, human beings prosper when they feel that they are making, or at least participating in, their own decisions.

The question to be addressed here is this: given the way we deny the sexuality rights of persons with disabilities, is it remotely possible that Professor Ronner’s vision – of voice, voluntariness and validation – will be fulfilled? In a thoughtful analysis of the underlying issues, Professor Julie Tennille has listed multiple benefits of a “communicative climate” for consumers with regard to sexuality issues.

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141. See Tennille & Wright, supra note 18 (“[h]ealthy sexual relationships can foster development and maintenance of new relationships, a key element in social integration; positive sexual partnerships can increase quality of life, and those with mental health conditions who maintain relationships often have better treatment outcomes; some research indicates that hospital readmission rates dropped if consumers were able to develop romantic relationships; and stigma of mental illness may be reduced” at 13-14).
and Isabel Grant have also used a therapeutic jurisprudential filter in weighing these issues.142 Both commentators have considered how to define “capacity to consent”143 and “engage in sexual activities,”144 and how to ensure that such definitions remain person-centered and allow for a “situational approach”145 to each case. They write: “incapacity can and should be defined situationally – in a functional manner that maximizes [a person’s] sexual self-determination.”146 However, Benedet and Grant’s thoughtful analysis and emphasis on the individual and his or her self-determination – two concepts linked with dignity – have not been greatly expanded upon in case law or legislation so as to give life to the therapeutic jurisprudential lens that they employ to view these issues of sexuality.

Twenty years ago, one of us (MLP) wrote the following about sexuality issues in the domestic context, and we believe that little has changed in the intervening two decades:

We must also question the therapeutic or antitherapeutic implications of official hospital policies that control the place, manner, and frequency with which such individuals can have sexual interactions. We must consider the implications of these policies on ward life and their implications for patients’ post-hospital lives. These questions are difficult ones, but we must ask them nonetheless if we wish to formulate a thoughtful, comprehensive response to the wide range of questions this subject raises.147

How does this all “fit” with the CRPD? We believe that the Convention “is a document that resonates with TJ values,”148 and that it reflects the three principles articulated by Professor Ronner – voice, validation and voluntariness,149 by looking at law “as it actually impacts people’s lives.”150 Each section of the CRPD empowers persons with mental disabilities, and one of the major aims of TJ is explicitly the empowerment of those

143. Ibid at 456.
144. Ibid at 453.
145. Ibid at 466.
146. Ibid at 450.
147. Perlin, “Beyond the Last Frontier?”, supra note 17 at 547.
149. Ronner, supra note 140 at 94-95.
whose lives are regulated by the legal system.\textsuperscript{151} The CRPD is, in many ways, a TJ blueprint. It privileges autonomy, promotes dignity, and values psychological health. If TJ encourages the law to “enhance [its] therapeutic potential,”\textsuperscript{152} enforcement of the CRPD serves that enforcement role in the way that persons with mental disabilities are treated with regard to their sexual being. If a TJ perspective is adopted, that will also be the best way to ensure that the sanism that pervades the law’s treatment of persons with mental disabilities on questions of sexuality and sexual expression is rooted out of the system.\textsuperscript{153}

If institutionalized persons with mental disabilities are granted the same sexual autonomy that the rest of us have, the former population will be given a voice. If persons with mental disabilities are allowed voluntary sexual interaction, that, by definition, provides the sort of participatory experience that leads to a sense of voluntariness within a therapeutic jurisprudence framework. And together, the grant of sexual autonomy and the concomitant right to voluntary sexual interaction help increase the self-validation of those in question.

We hope that scholars and advocates take seriously the intersection between sexuality issues, TJ issues and human rights issues, and turn their attention more fully to this question in future years.

IV. Conclusion

As society in general becomes increasingly open and direct about sex and sexuality, “[a]ided by the values of a consumer culture and encouraged by the growing visibility of sex in the public realm, many now regard sexual pleasure as a legitimate component of their lives.”\textsuperscript{154} This openness and

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid. See also, e.g. Astrid Birgden & Michael I. Perlin, “‘Where the Home in the Valley Meets the Damp Dirty Prison’: A Human Rights Perspective on Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Role of Forensic Psychologists in Correctional Settings” (2009) 14:4 Aggression & Violent Behavior 256.

\textsuperscript{152} See e.g. Perlin, “Role of Counsel”, supra note 133 at 751.

\textsuperscript{153} Perlin, “Neonaticide”, supra note 48 at 25. On “[t]he peculiar interplay between sanism and sexuality” see Perlin, “Everybody is Making Love”, supra note 46 at 506; see generally Perlin, “Sanist Blindness”, supra note 133 at 591 (discussing how TJ “might be a redemptive tool in efforts to combat sanism, as a means of stripping bare the law’s sanist façade”).

directness must be allowed to extend to persons with disabilities if full equality for this population is to be achieved.

Given the lack of statutory authority, case law, and scholarly articles within this topic, we can only offer conclusions based on our beliefs on the rights of persons with disabilities to their sexual autonomy. There is minimal research to analyze, few statutes to interpret, and few articles to debate; rather, we must rely on the school of thought that upholds equality in every aspect of life for persons with disabilities. The CRPD and the guidelines of therapeutic jurisprudence offer us a starting point from which to offer recommendations for scholars, lawmakers, clinicians, and those with mental disabilities.

First, sexual issues must be seen as multi-textured, and the meaning of “sex” must be carefully defined.

Second, we ignore cultural attitudes at our own risk.

Third, many of the critical issues – behavioural, legal, social, and political – remained unanswered, in large part because of the taboos that surround this entire area of law, policy, and social inquiry. This all remains very under-discussed because we are still so astonishingly uncomfortable thinking about the questions at hand. We desire to close our eyes to the reality that persons with mental disabilities are sexual beings, and close our minds to the fact that their sexuality may be much more like “ours” than it is different.

Fourth, the UN Convention – finally – forces us to reconsider how myopic we continue to be about these issues, and realize that sexuality rights are rights that must be enforced.

Fifth, application of a therapeutic jurisprudence lens to this question forces us to confront how the core principles of TJ are regularly disregarded in our social responses to these issues, and that the three V’s articulated by Professor Ronner are rarely, if ever, honoured.

Sixth, the use of the TJ filter – in the context of the articulated principles of international human rights law – offers us a means of approaching these questions in a new and, potentially, socially redemptive

\[\text{Part 1}^{\text{a}} (2005) 26:3 \text{Australian \& New Zealand Journal of Family Therapy} 155 \text{ at } 157; \text{see also Appel, supra note } 36 \text{ at } 154 \text{ (on the fundamentality of sexual pleasure as a right).}\]
way, and in a way that, optimally, erases sanist attitudes.

In *Love Is Just a Four-Letter Word*, Bob Dylan characterizes love, in the context of the relationship about which he is singing as “unmentionable by name.” Love and sex have forever been “unmentionable by name” when we discuss persons with mental disabilities, especially those who are institutionalized, notwithstanding the revolutions that we have seen in the past four decades: sexual revolutions, civil rights revolutions, and disability rights revolutions. And these issues – in the context of this paper – have become even more pointed in the years since the international human rights movement and the mental disability law movement have been joined, and the CRPD ratified. Perhaps, now, we can finally devote to this area of law and policy the attention it deserves.

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