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Deleuze and the Maiden: A Short Introduction to Legal Pornology

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I. THE VANISHING BEGINNINGS

Between 1945 and 1947, Gilles Deleuze gave to several prestigious publications five texts that together formed the first moment of his work—the moment prior to the great silence preceding the appearance of *Empiricism and Subjectivity*. The texts were brilliant and singular and were the reason that, despite his young age, all those in the entourage of Marie-Madeleine Davy, his mentor during the Occupation, saw in Deleuze a “new Sartre.”¹ Later on, however, he chose to pull these texts from his bibliography, and he even went as far as to forbid any reproduction or reunion in volume, be it even after his death. These texts saw themselves fully excluded from the canon of his work—as if Deleuze had wanted to signify that they, too, were part of the meditative silence preceding his first veritable work: his first book. These texts could hold no status other than that of the scholastic exercise, of the draft having no purpose other than to serve as training ground for the progressive development of future concepts. When, much later, Deleuze presented his famous definition of philosophy—philosophy is “the creation of concepts”²—he was undoubtedly thinking back to his own development. It was these five texts that he was hoping to see disappear and replaced with a long, unseen stretch that could have constituted the “somber precursor” of his own thought; to this end, the existence of his first texts was too *clear and distinct*. The event of the creation of a concept could not be thought of as a *fiat lux* because it was already included in the pleat of the world. However, this inclusion was still, and necessarily, in the process of unfolding. On the other hand, if this event had a precursor, it had no draft; in the precursor the event’s perfection had already to be whole, as the entire content of a rhizome can be found in the smallest of its branches. Such, perhaps, was the justification and purpose of Deleuze’s renunciation of his first texts: once they had been published, they became too real. They were no longer virtual enough.

II. DESCRIPTION OF WOMAN

Deleuze’s very first text, *Description of Woman: For a Philosophy of the Sexed Other*, which appeared in *Poesie 45* in the fall of 1945, could be considered privileged evidence in the quest for the reasons that pushed Deleuze to make these youthful texts disappear.³ Since the 1943 publication of Jean-Paul Sartre’s *Being and Nothingness*, Deleuze ceaselessly professed his growing admiration for the book, as Michel Tournier described in *Le Vent Paraclet*.⁴ When he discovered Sartre’s book, explains Tournier, Deleuze telephoned him every day so as to include him in the enthusiastic observations born as his reading progressed. But, soon after France’s Liberation following World War II, when Sartre’s fame increased exponentially, Deleuze’s disappointment was commensurate with his erstwhile enthusiasm; *Sartre*,

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1. Cf. FRANCOIS DOSSE, GILLES DELEUZE ET FÉLIX GUATTARI: BIOGRAPHIE CROISÉE 116 (2007).
 2. Cf. GILLES DELEUZE & FÉLIX GUATTARI, QU’EST-CE QUE LA PHILOSOPHIE? *passim* (1991).
 3. Gilles Deleuze, *Description de la Femme: Pour une Philosophie d’Autrui Sexuée*, 28 POÉSIE 28–39 (1945).
 4. MICHEL TOURNIER, LE VENT PARACLET (1977).

after all, was a humanist. In the meantime, *Description of Woman* had appeared and, while it was intended to act as an *addendum* to the chapters of *Being and Nothingness* relative to desire and sexuality, it was also his way of picking up one of Sartre's reproaches of Heidegger. Sartre had reproached Heidegger's philosophy for having painted only the portrait of an asexual humanity—precisely where, in reality, sexuality is the cause of everything. In *Description of Woman*, Deleuze therefore attempts to give “philosophical dignity” to the forgotten figure of woman—a “dignity” whose principal traits were formulated according to the terms of Sartrean thought. However, even if this was something of a “pastiche” (as François Dosse stressed⁵), Deleuze's article showed early signs of several obsessions that one would find again in his “recognized” works. First and foremost among these was his appreciation for surfaces; in women, explained Deleuze, that which counts before all else is *makeup*—that is, the manner by which an artificial surface is given to that which would otherwise be nothing more than a blind interiority.

III. THEORIZING MAKEUP

In the eyes of the young Deleuze, in order to even begin to contemplate woman's fundamental interiority—as opposed to man's fundamental exteriority—any theory concerning woman had to be a theory about makeup. To this end, Deleuze differentiated two main cosmetic categories: “surface” makeup (e.g., powders, foundation, blush) and “cavity” makeup (e.g., mascara, eyeliner, lipstick).⁶ If cosmetics of the first category, Deleuze explained, allow one to enhance the surface of a woman's face, then only those of the second category could help reveal, by tracing the exterior, her fundamental interiority. To outline the eyes or the mouth is to invite the viewer to plunge into this interiority, i.e., to challenge his existence. To challenge his existence, Deleuze added, is to challenge the existence of the world—“woman is a concrete universal, she is a world, not an exterior world, but the underside of the world, the tepid interiority of the world, a concentration of the interiorized world. Hence the prodigious sexual success of woman: to possess woman is to possess the world.”⁷ Thus, in describing these two types of makeup and in presenting the woman in makeup as keeper of the secret of the world's interiority—a secret only accessible by means of cosmetic artifice—Deleuze revealed himself. What he revealed about himself was more than that which his future ethic of discretion would be able to accept: he revealed the character—more importantly, the *cerebral* character—of his relationship with sexuality and with women. However, he also revealed the instinctual truth that feeds all ideas of mask, makeup, cosmetics, or simulacra—a formulated truth, this time put in terms *too* sexed to be admissible. Even before he began developing the theory of desire, the cosmic accents of which would bring him fame, the real truth of this theory had already been made visible to all: *there can be no desire other than that of a man for a woman in makeup.*

5. Dosse, *supra* note 1, at 119.

6. Deleuze, *supra* note 3, at 33–34.

7. *Id.* at 32.

IV. THE GIRL'S ENTRANCE

In Deleuze's subsequent work, his fascination with the figure of woman would take a more discreet and more complicated turn, and, henceforth, the woman of *Description* would no longer make any explicit appearance. In the meantime, as Catherine Clement noted (and who remains the only person to have done so), another character would progressively take on a more considerable role in his work: the girl.⁸ From Deleuze's *Coldness and Cruelty*⁹ to his *Kafka*, from *Proust and Signs*¹⁰ to *The Logic of Sense*,¹¹ girls proliferate in Deleuze's work as so many anamorphoses of the forgotten woman.¹² If, from this point on, neither makeup nor interiority is the main concern, the girl, then, occupies a strange place within his system: that of the *perturbing other*. The girl is the element whose presence spells the impossibility that an order, whatever its form, is able to enjoy the comfort of its own enclosure—an order where, most often, the actors are fathers and mothers. In Deleuze's vocabulary, one would say that girls represent numerous "lines of flight" through which that which claims to be contained at the interior of an order actually ends up revealing the insoluble dimension of this same claim. The most striking example of this is the role that sisters, maids, and prostitutes (three different forms of the girl) play at the core of Kafka's work, as Deleuze and Guattari suggested in their *Kafka*.¹³ The machinery of the law, in which the protagonists of Kafka's work are constantly implicated, reveals vacuoles that manage to except themselves from it. These are vacuoles—frenetic gaps within the machinery of the law—where the law is turned upside-down and where it has no power. The derangement that girls produce in Kafka's characters is the same derangement produced by Lewis Carroll's Alice in the Queen of Hearts's croquet game¹⁴ and that is produced by the groups of adolescents in *In Search of Lost Time*'s obsessive narrator. In all of these situations, a state of regulated things is confronted by a reality that is stronger than its will to maintain regulation: the *reality of desire*.

V. THE DIVIDED WORLD OF WOMEN

When he moved from woman to girl, Deleuze initially did nothing more than pass from the concrete reality of this desire ("to possess woman is to possess the world") to a more abstract, thus more euphemized, reality. Desire—instinctive and born of a

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8. Cf. C. Clément, *LES PETITES FILLES OU LES AVENTURES DE LA PHILOSOPHIE*, Gilles Deleuze, Paris, Inculce, 2005, p. 17 et seq. (republishation that became a special issue of *L'Arc*, n° 49, 1972, dedicated to Deleuze) (on file with author).
 9. GILLES DELEUZE, *PRÉSENTATION DE SACHER-MASOCH: LE FROID ET LE CRUEL* (1967) (on file with author).
 10. GILLES DELEUZE, *PROUST ET LES SIGNES* (1964).
 11. GILLES DELEUZE, *LOGIQUE DU SENS* (1969).
 12. See LAURENT DE SUTTER, *DELEUZE: LA PRATIQUE DU DROIT* 59–60 (2009).
 13. Cf. GILLES DELEUZE & FÉLIX GUATTARI, *KAFKA: POUR UNE LITTÉRATURE MINEURE* 113–19 (1975).
 14. See generally LEWIS CARROLL, *ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND* 112–29 (Boston, Lee & Shepard 1869) (1865) (narrating when Alice disrupts the Queen's croquet match and is almost beheaded).

positive idea of woman—became the pure concept of a negative idea of this same woman, while the girl, in opposition with the mother, became the woman wearing makeup. While, as a positive idea, the woman grants access to the interiority of the world, as a negative idea, she does not grant men the satisfaction of a definitive installation in the order of exteriority that is constitutive of man. This movement from the concrete to the abstract, or from the positive to the negative, did not come without a price: henceforth, the world of women would be divided into two unequal parts. With the presence of the figure of the girl, access to the interiority of the world—or the disconcertion of the installation in a pure exteriority—was no longer a possibility open to all women. Only girls, as *women wearing makeup*, could claim to offer this access, while other women, those *not wearing makeup*, found themselves confined in the same exteriority as men—or, more accurately, found themselves deprived of their constitutive interiority in such a way that their presence in the world of exteriority suddenly had no value other than that of a ghost or specter. Similarly, for the young Deleuze, makeup was the source of desire aroused by the experience of the interiority offered by women, while, for the mature Deleuze, this source was found only within girls. Thus, a kind of disequilibrium was introduced into women as a group: the power to offer the experience of interiority was reserved for a minority, but this experience, too, was affected by disequilibrium. Indeed, the experience of interiority no longer brought about reconciliation with the world; it had become a perturbation.

VI. DISORDER AND TECHNÈ

Despite the fact that, as stated above, the figure of the girl is recurring, Deleuze never described in a systematic manner the perturbation of the world's order that this figure introduces. The revolutionary force inherent in the desire aroused by the girl was, to him, a precise enough explanatory factor that further development was unnecessary. The question posed by the figure of the girl, for Deleuze, could be answered by the desire that she provoked, i.e. in the Spinozism of the event that, today, one still attaches to his name. However, the singular relationship in his work involving the girl and desire merited further inquiry. Deleuze should have asked the question that, according to him, was the most important: "How?" In other words, how does the girl manage to perturb, through the desire that she arouses, the world's order—how does she create a "line of flight" interior its exteriority? That what Deleuze called a "conceptual personae" be attached in a privileged manner to desire signaled, in effect, that implicated here was something fitting of a *drama*. Desire concerns not only the event and becoming—it concerns the *machination* of the event and of becoming; it concerns their construction or creation: "How does one perturb order?" "How does one create disorder?" Such was the nature of the question posed by the figure of the girl in Deleuze's work—a question to which the concept of desire, as such, could provide no answer. In order to begin answering this question, one would have to reread *Description of Woman*—that is, Deleuze needed to reconcile with his own *Sartrean* past, indeed, with his own desires. The answer, then, would have appeared clear as day. To create disorder, a very simple act suffices, and, as it is

very simple, it is impossible to elude: she simply needs to pull out her tube of lipstick. Cosmetics are, themselves, the *techné* of disorder.

VII. THE PORNO ORDER OF LAW

Perhaps it was necessary to give an example of the *cosmetics of the event* for which Deleuze, owing to his strange obsession for girls, became *nolens volens*, the silent advocate. In *Kafka*, Deleuze and Guattari made considerable efforts to establish the validity of the following theorem, one that could have seemed a little extravagant: the theorem that the law is written “on a porno book.”¹⁵ In their eyes, this theorem had first to be considered as the enunciation of the reality, which the theorem claimed provided the following description: the judges’ library in *The Trial*¹⁶ contained only obscene works. However, beyond this description, the theorem suggested that the reality thus described was also reality on another level: the level that one could permissibly call “critique”—if the term were restituted, as it was by Deleuze, to its specific usage. To say “the law is written on a book of porno” is to underline that Kafka’s work, in staging judges as readers of obscene works, meant to suggest something about *the law itself*. In other words, the fact is that the books consulted by the judges during their audiences were works divorced not from their function, but, on the contrary, from that which to them was the most fitting. If the works the judges read could be said to constitute, together, a gigantic “porno book,” it is precisely because they are *books of law*—or, more accurately: *the book of the law*. Yet, since the obscene episodes described in these books were reminiscent of those occurring in corridors of the Hall of Justice, an ambiguity appeared in Deleuze and Guattari’s theorem. What was the difference between the depictions appearing in the book of the law and the moments of derangement that Joseph K. experienced in the company of maids, of girls, and of prostitutes? What was the difference between the *porno order of the law* and the disorder—or perturbation—that, according to the hypothesis formed elsewhere by Deleuze, girls supposedly herald? Could this be due to the fact that the first case is solely concerned with *images*?

VIII. FANTASIES AS REALITIES

That an image is described as “porno”—or, in a broader sense, that it could give rise to desire—also counts among the possibilities left aside by Deleuze until he wrote his books on cinema. It is barely, if at all, that Deleuze, in a 1985 interview subsequent to the publication of *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, allowed himself to bring attention to the lobotomized character of “the majority of cinematographic production, with its arbitrary violence and its mindless eroticism.”¹⁷ Again, eroticism—as a category of the explanation of the desire animating the images—was grafted onto the cerebral and onto that of the image disconnected from any and all things imaginary. Moreover, at

15. DELEUZE & GUATTARI, *supra* note 13, at 90.

16. FRANZ KAFKA, *THE TRIAL* 21 (David Wyllie trans., Project Gutenberg eBook 10th ed. 2005) (1925).

17. GILLES DELEUZE, *Sur l’Image-Temps*, in *POURPARLERS* 86 (1990).

around the same time, in the answers Deleuze gave to a questionnaire from a cinema magazine, he did not hesitate to admit that he “did not attach much importance to the notion of the imaginary.”¹⁸ Thus, it is easy to understand why the great absentee in Deleuze’s philosophy of image is the notion of fantasy that Lacanian psychoanalysis had attached to that of the imaginary. In his thought, there is no fantasy; there are only realities whose modalities, while variable, nevertheless embody the general character of these realities. However, because his philosophy is of an absolute realism, Deleuze’s thought is obstructed by the figure of the girl who appears incessantly in his work and who arouses the fantasies of those who encounter her, starting with Deleuze himself. One can certainly speak of a “mindless eroticism” in the case of the pornographic images in which Kafka’s judges delight, but what about the tricks turned by prostitutes? Were they not “images” and thus “realities” able to claim a type of dignity equivalent to that of other images, be they “porno” or not? On this point, Deleuze was never clear. His taste for the cerebral prevented him from perceiving that fantasy, as all things, could be called *real*.

IX. LAW’S DERANGEMENT

If, as Deleuze and Guattari hypothesized, a “porno book” is the cornerstone of the order of the law, then it must also be the cornerstone of disorder—put differently, porn is the *milieu* of the law. In the milieu of the law, porn is that which *ordains disorder*: porn is the operation by which the law reveals its fantasized power and, through this fantasy, its true impotence. In this sense, it is possible to maintain that the cosmetics of the event—whose terms were laid out in *Description of Woman*—were certainly a realism of fantasy. The concrete fantasy that is aroused by the presence of the girl *is* the operator that introduces in the law an *outside interior* by which the comfort of “exteriority” is quickly destroyed—or, more accurately, deranged. If this operator of disorder is in fact cerebral, it is cerebral in the same way that “mindless eroticism” is “lobotomized”—and, in turn, the same way that the “imaginary” is constituted by the fantasy galvanizing the operator. When they wrote that “the law is written on a porno book,” Deleuze and Guattari were suggesting, despite themselves, that the law was much more than a book: it was an image. Moreover, it was not only one image, but a *film*. This film of fantasies aroused by girls is the medium through which the operation resulting in the complete derangement of the order of the law extends and acts as that which makes possible this same order. *The reality of the order of the law is the same reality of the pornographic fantasies aroused by girls—that is, by women in makeup*, as makeup is that which gives body to the fantasy of interiority. We can thus summarize all ambiguity of the role played by the girl in Deleuze’s thought by saying that she is the incarnation of the desire that gives rise to the event, *as incarnation of fantasies that give rise to disorder*. But this ambiguity goes beyond her own reality; this ambiguity is somehow able to contaminate all images.

18. GILLES DELEUZE, *Doutes sur l’Imaginaire*, in POURPARLERS 94 (1990).

X. THE SUBJECT STRIKES BACK

Like all of the philosophers of his generation, Deleuze interminably claimed that he dismissed the subject of a specific and contemporary tendency of thought; but just when he thought tendency departed, he, like his contemporaries, kept seeing it reappear in his work.¹⁹ In Deleuze's philosophy of cinema, though the phenomenon is subtler than it is elsewhere, the outcome is the same: the ghostly return of the *spectator*. When Jacques Rancière claimed that Deleuze's philosophy of cinema was a philosophy of nothing other than itself (and thus certainly not of cinema), he, too, misunderstood this ghostly return.²⁰ In claiming to establish a "natural history" of cinema, in which different branches would designate different types of images, Deleuze's explicit agenda was to reinvent the concept of time. But the fact that this reinvention was written within the framework of a history of cinema could lead one to think that only a film (and, then, only a "great" film) was capable of delivering *experience*. Deleuze's philosophy of cinema, in this sense, was much closer to phenomenology than were any of his other works—given that in his philosophy he was proposing an *aesthetic of the reception of time*. Cinema's images, as *media princeps* of the different forms of time, were unthinkable without at least a spectator capable of using them to draw up the exhaustive catalogue—a spectator like Deleuze himself, or, for that matter, anybody. One understands better, then, why the "mindless eroticism" about which he spoke in his interview on *The Time-Image* did not have, in the catalogue, a positive counterpart. For Deleuze, eroticism was always "mindless" in that he would substitute the pure cerebral nature of thought, vis-à-vis time, with another cerebral nature. Here, the cerebral nature would be impure: the fantastic experience of images. Given that, on one hand, eroticism was always "mindless," and that, on the other, all experience was that of a subject tormented by fantasies, the conclusion was self-evident: *all experience is mindless—thus erotic*.

XI. DISMISSING THE EXPERIENCE OF IMAGES

It was necessary for Deleuze to relinquish his role as cinematic spectator in order to describe images as pure forms of the concept of time and to forget the fantasies that he had, in the first place, excluded. He needed to dismiss the experience of images and, through this, the singular erotic experience of the spectator, so as to relocate the girls in a film to a place where they would no longer pose a threat. For, when he claimed to implement a system of time through the examination of the different forms of images able to be adopted by the same system, he was actually trying to avoid danger. This danger was the reappearance of *Description of Woman* and, therefore, that of the "humanism" that he and Tournier had, at one time, reproached in their predecessor, Sartre. Like Sartre, Deleuze failed to leave humanism

19. See generally SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, *LE SUJET QUI FÂCHE: LE CENTRE ABSENT DE L'ONTOLOGIE POLITIQUE* (Stathis Kouvélakis trans., 2007).

20. Cf. Jacques Rancière, *L'affect indécis: Propos recueillis par Patrice Blouin, Elie During et Dork Zabunyan*, 692–93, *REVUE CRITIQUE* 142–43 (2005) (on file with author). Alain Badiou also made the same error. See ALAIN BADIOU, *DELEUZE: LA CLAMEUR DE L'ÊTRE* 27 (1997).

behind—simply because he, like Sartre, continued to desire in the most banal and least Spinozian mode possible. In rereading *Description of Woman* and in comparing it with the figures of girls appearing elsewhere in his work, one realizes that the praise of makeup was in fact a praise of *images*. Precisely, it was a praise of girls as images—that is, the girls that one finds in magazines and to whom makeup gives a remarkable reality. The catalogue of the different types of images—the drawing up of which Deleuze dedicated himself to in his books about cinema—was the cerebral form taken by the catalogue of the different types of girls. When he was describing these different types of girls as a source of derangement within the order of the law, it was thus necessary to understand that girls were, above all, a source of derangement for *him* and, notably, for the philosophic order that he was trying to establish. Girls were the persistent sign of the cerebral fantasy that pushed him to find in the concept a world where the strength of desire could finally be expressed in full freedom.

XII. PORTRAIT OF THE LEGAL PRACTITIONER AS A YOUNG GIRL

With *Description of Woman* as the hidden key to the relationship that Deleuze maintained with women and with images, it became possible to comprehend the extent to which it was necessary to renounce this work. In truth, the renunciation came with a drastic consequence: with it went the possibility of an “outside” to philosophy—a place in the world where the concept would not be the only admissible entity. In the same way that girls appear only as contraband in Deleuze’s work, this “outside” returned from time to time in the most unexpected form. This form was that of legal practice. Be it in his interviews with Claire Parnet, in *A Thousand Plateaus*,²¹ or in *Coldness and Cruelty*, the practice of law, according to Deleuze, shared with girls a spectral status. The reason for this shared status was clear though, undoubtedly, unexpected: *girls and the practice of law are, in reality, one and the same*. In the same way as girls, legal practice, in Deleuze’s writing, intervenes only to disturb the comfortable order of the law, the same order of which philosophy claimed to be herald. The practice of law is the arena in which the law—the system of rules that claim to uphold order—fails to enclose its own exteriority. It is the arena where the “internal outside” of the law appears, the exteriority of its exteriority, the practice of its concepts. The law—a legacy of the Greek philosophy of *nomos*—is that which law’s practice—a legacy of the Roman practice of *ius*, continuously deranges by demonstrating the impossibility of the former’s claims, whatever they may be.²² In *Coldness and Cruelty*, this opposition was clear: the “images of the law,” having been conceived throughout the history of philosophy (Plato or Kant), were always in symmetric opposition to the critiques of these same images.²³ But these critiques were themselves only the first moment of a much more radical derangement within the system of the law: a purely negative moment followed by a positive moment. The negative moment was that of the philosophical critique—the positive, that of the legal clinic.

21. GILLES DELEUZE & FÉLIX GUATTARI, *MILLE PLATEAUX* (Minuit 1980).

22. On the reconstruction of this thesis, see DE SUTTER, *supra* note 12, at 104–05.

23. *Cf.* DELEUZE, *supra* note 9, at 71.

XIII. PHILOSOPHY'S SELF-DESTRUCTION

Such, perhaps, was the source of Deleuze's uneasiness: philosophy, because it continued to dismiss the possibility of an outside of concept (an outside of the cerebral), remained grafted to a juridical thought. Girls who derange—through the fantasies that they arouse—the cerebral order of desire had to be rejected by juridical thought in the same way that the practice of law had to be presented as antagonistic to philosophy. But, since Deleuze's philosophical endeavor aimed precisely to reintroduce into the order of philosophy this outside that had previously been excluded, he needed girls just as he needed legal practice. He needed them for structural reasons—to establish the possibility of an outside of philosophy—as much as for personal reasons—to restore the presence of his fantasy (that which was unmentionable). That he never wished to justify these reasons and that he prohibited any future publication of the text that would allow one to uncover these reasons are two of the most awkward theoretical moves of the past half-century. To give girls and the practice of law a philosophical dignity, as antagonists of philosophy, could only have been a foreseeable possibility had Deleuze accepted the reality of fantasies and the necessity of the spectator. However, since he had decided, due to historical context, to follow the contemporary critical movement of the imaginary and of the subject, he foreclosed the possibility. Retrospectively, the true radicalism of his thought resided not in this *satisfecit* given to the requirements of his time, but in the proclamation of philosophy's self-destruction. Self-destruction was placed at the heart of his thinking, like a landmine waiting to be detonated—waiting because Deleuze, after having placed it, had preferred to pull out of the danger zone. Or, at least, he pretended to try—an attempt that could very well have been just another one of his tricks.

XIV. PORNOLOGY = GIRLS + IMAGES + THE PRACTICE OF LAW

Despite his rejection of “mindless eroticism,” there is one of Deleuze's words that must be remembered: we need, he explained in *Coldness and Cruelty*, a new “pornoology.”²⁴ This word, which occurs only once (in *Coldness and Cruelty*), is not the object of a specific development, and, if nothing else, is used in order to point to the application of a pornographic logic to philosophy. Like the concept of “simulacra” in *The Logic of Sense* or in *Difference and Repetition*,²⁵ this was also a kind of theoretical *hapax* that was abandoned the moment it appeared, before any decisive installation could be made. Again, perhaps one must see in this almost immediate denial the trace of a temptation that was existentially irresistible, but one that philosophy's exigencies are inclined to reject. However, as with girls and the practice of law (simulacra or, shall we say, *images*), this temptation seems to involve more than a simple intuition; it lays out a veritable system. For Alain Badiou, all of Deleuze's philosophy needed to be considered a system, in the same way one considers Classical French Philosophy, namely that of Descartes or Malebranche, to be a system of its

24. *Id.* at 18.

25. GILLES DELEUZE, *DIFFÉRENCE ET RÉPÉTITION* (1968).

own.²⁶ If this is true, then one must not forget to add that Deleuze's philosophical system is coupled with a drop shadow: a counter-system continuously coming to parasitize the perfection of the first system. Girls, the practice of law, and images form the main parts of this counter-system—a counter-system whose name it would not be far-fetched to suppose is, precisely, “pornology.” Pornology is the antiphilosophic move by which philosophy gives itself its own outside, while at the same time doing all in its power to ensure that this outside will be declared impossible. Thus, the following equation—pornology = girls + images + practice of law—is an antiphilosophic and explosive equation with which, though Deleuze refused to explicitly use it, he went about undermining his texts. Deleuze two-timed himself.

XV. THE THREE THEOREMS OF LEGAL PORNOLOGY

It would require numerous efforts to fully reconstruct Deleuze's antiphilosophic system—and to do it the justice that Deleuze denied it. In guise of introduction, perhaps, one could remember only the most important of the enounced while waiting for a more rigorous coherence, somewhere, someday. The enounced are numbered at three and form three theorems capable of both demonstration and illustration: the theorem of girl, the theorem of image, and the theorem of the practice of law. The theorem of girls would be: *all order gives rise to its own disorder in the attempt to foreclose its possibility*—the foreclosure of the possibility of disorder creates disorder. Then, the theorem of image: *all reality gives rise to its own limitlessness in the attempt to exclude its opposite*—it is the refusal of fantasies that makes them a reality. Finally, the theorem of the practice of law: *law—as a system of rules—gives rise to its own annulment in the attempt to control practice*—it is the avowal of the supremacy of the law that annuls all possibility of the law. If it is difficult to articulate these three theorems in a manner other than their equivalence—where girls, the practice of law, and images would be one and the same—one may always try. Thus, let us propose this: the girl, being that which arouses in the law fantasies (images) that perturb the cerebral regularity of its desire, is the conceptual persona of which law is the practice. As an aphorism: the practice of law is the cosmetics of disorder, and thus the vibration of life introduced into the interior of the abstract order of the law. Undoubtedly, this lesson will be found to be deceiving. Undoubtedly, to transform the practice of law into the incarnation of life will be considered a very narrow (because it is libidinal) understanding of the latter. It is possible, however, given that a broad understanding of life has consistently contributed to juridical thought, it is only this narrow type of understanding that, from now on, will be able *to turn us on*.

26. Cf. BADIOU, *supra* note 20, at 29.