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FEDERAL COURTS AT THE CROSSROADS*

The forthcoming Bicentennial celebration, commemorating the framing of the United States Constitution, presents a special opportunity for judges and lawyers to become involved in educating their fellow citizens about our national charter. The National Commission on the Bicentennial describes this important occasion as "an historic opportunity for all Americans to learn about and recall the achievements of our Founders and the knowledge and experience that inspired them, the nature of the government they established, its origins, its character, and its ends, and the rights and privileges of citizenship, as well as its attendant responsibilities."¹

I have spoken elsewhere of the "public obligations" of lawyers² and of the "communication responsibility" of judges.³ I think that the proper performance of those ethical duties during the Bicentennial year requires judges and lawyers to join forces in advancing the constitutional literacy of all Americans. I am privileged to serve on a special committee appointed by the Chief Judge of my Court, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, to develop appropriate projects and programs relating to the

Bicentennial observance. Other courts and bar associations throughout the nation are planning commemorative publications, lectures, debates, exhibitions and events of various kinds. I believe that the members of the American College of Trial Lawyers also should participate, individually and as a collegial body, in this important work. It seems to me that election to membership in this prestigious organization carries with it a unique responsibility -- a special obligation to make available to your fellow citizens your observations and opinions regarding the operation of the federal courts created under Article III of the Constitution. Yours is an insightful knowledge of litigation in our national court system not available to the general population or even to a significant portion of the bar. I urge you to share that knowledge with your non-litigating colleagues and with the citizenry at large, as we mark the 200th year of our Constitution's birth. It is most important that you do so because, after functioning for almost two centuries, the federal courts are at the crossroads. Tonight, I shall share with you some of my thoughts about the problems that have brought us to the crossroads, the effects those problems are having on our federal judicial system and the path we should follow for the future.

That there has been in recent years an expansion in the size of the federal judiciary and in the volume of the cases it handles is common knowledge. The extent of that expansion may not be so widely known. The Framers of the Constitution

contemplated a limited number of courts having a very restricted jurisdiction. Hamilton foresaw, in No. 81 of the Federalist Papers, "four or five, or half-a-dozen" federal districts.⁴ Today, there are ninety-four federal districts with five hundred seventy-five district judges, and thirteen federal circuits with one hundred sixty-eight judges. Eighty-five of those judges, sixty-one in the district courts and twenty-four in the courts of appeals, hold seats first established by Congress in 1789.⁵ But the creation of new judgeships has not kept pace with increasing caseloads, and already there are requests for yet more judgeships to be created.⁶

During the period from 1964 to 1984, the caseloads in the United States District Courts grew by 20%.⁷ Between 1952 and 1982, while the nation's population increased by 50%, appeals to the circuit courts grew by 80%.⁸ The growth continues. In 1985, more than two hundred seventy-three thousand civil cases were filed in the nation's district courts, an increase of nearly 5% over 1984 and of almost 33% over 1982.⁹ More than 39,000 criminal cases were filed in the district courts in 1985, 7% more than in 1984 and approximately 21% more than in 1982.¹⁰ In 1985, more than 33,000 appeals were filed in the circuit courts nationwide, about 6% more than in 1984 and almost 44% more than in 1980.¹¹ Closer to home, the figures are even more startling. Here in the Southern District of New York, civil case filings for 1985 exceeded those for 1984 by almost 6%, but the increase in criminal case filings for the same period was an astounding

51.5%!¹² In my circuit court, appeals filings increased from 2,153 in 1980 to 2,837 in 1985, continuing the trend.¹³ These statistics starkly illustrate the litigation explosion that has brought the federal courts to the gridlocked crossroads of which I speak.

What are the causes of these massive caseloads? Where do the cases come from? It is a revealing statistic that more than 43% of all civil actions filed in the district courts for the 12-month period ending June 30, 1985 are classified as statutory actions.¹⁴ Included in this category of cases are state and federal prisoner petitions as well as civil rights, social security, labor law, antitrust, tax and various other statutory claims.¹⁵ While humorists may say that no person's life or property is safe while Congress is in session, federal judges do have cause for alarm every time Congress meets. During the closing days of the session just concluded, for example, major legislative programs affecting taxes, immigration and drug abuse were enacted into law. Each of the new statutes eventually will require interpretation and enforcement in federal court proceedings, giving rise to more cases in the geometric progression of our workload.

During 1985, more than 33,000 cases were filed in district courts by state and federal prisoners challenging their convictions under statutory provisions for habeas relief.¹⁶ Filings under civil rights statutes rose to almost 20,000 cases nationwide in 1985.¹⁷ Prisoners complaining of their conditions

of confinement accounted for a great number of these cases as well. It is no secret that the great majority of prisoners' cases are without basis in law or fact. During my service as a district judge, I was confronted with a complaint by an inmate who claimed that he was deprived of his civil rights because he received a failing grade in some course he was taking in prison. I well remember the particular case, because the inmate referred to himself throughout his papers as "your despondent." I have the impression that these types of cases cause many judges to be equally despondent. Many of the non-prisoner civil rights claims really are state tort claims for malicious prosecution and false arrest dressed up in constitutional finery. The lawyers make it clear that statutory provisions for fees to successful claimants¹⁸ make federal court practice very attractive in these cases.

Many other types of statutory actions presently compete for attention in the Article III courts. Social security cases, although subject to several tiers of administrative review, accounted for more than 19,000 filings in the district courts last year.¹⁹ The civil RICO statute now permits common fraud actions to be pursued in federal courts,²⁰ and filings in these cases are increasing daily. Employment discrimination, labor law, securities act and tax suits of various kinds, all in ever greater numbers, provide grist for the federal court mill through legislation enacted by Congress with little consideration given to the impact of that legislation on the courts.

Of all the legislative activity of Congress in recent years, it seems to me that our national legislature has outdone itself in defining new crimes. Ever since the Supreme Court decided that criminal jurisdiction could be founded on a congressional declaration that interstate commerce was affected by what essentially is a local crime,²¹ the enthusiasm of Congress for enacting criminal laws has known no bounds. Here in New York City, federal prosecutors are using the federal courts to prosecute possession and sale of small amounts of drugs on the city streets, and a thirty-dollar "buy and bust" case handled by city police officers recently found its way to our Court.²² These types of cases not only add great volume to the federal courts; they also contribute to the federalization of the criminal law. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 added a number of new federal crimes that could just as well be prosecuted in local courts by state and local authorities. Among these is theft of livestock.²³ The Act will have a special impact on the dockets of courts of appeals, because both prosecution and defense will be allowed to appeal length of sentence when the new sentencing guidelines become effective.

At the beginning of the Republic, there were grave concerns that the states would erect oppressive barriers to commerce, interfere with mercantile trade, and prefer their own businessmen to businessmen from other states. Included in these concerns was the fear that the citizens of one state would not get a fair shake in the courts of another state in commercial and other

matters. Of this fear was diversity of citizenship jurisdiction born. Today, we are told, there is little concern about a fair shake for businessmen. Lawyers are frank in arguing the benefits of retaining diversity -- choice of forum, liberal and uniform procedural rules, more knowledgeable judges and juries, and even, until Congress acted a few weeks ago, cheaper filing fees. Whatever the reasons for its retention, the federal courts are awash in diversity cases, and our judges are busy trying to ascertain and apply the laws of fifty states. Just this past week, I served on a panel confronted with the problem of interpreting a confusing Connecticut statute that had been addressed only by two trial level state courts. If that weren't bad enough, the Presiding Judge of our panel was constrained to recuse himself when he realized that he was the Governor of Connecticut at the time the statute was enacted. In any event, there has been a tremendous increase in diversity filings in recent years, an increase that has made a significant impact on the workload of the federal courts.

There are, of course, other causes for the federal court litigation explosion -- expansive judicial interpretations of various constitutional and statutory provisions, a great increase in the number of lawyers, free legal services for indigent criminal defendants, and sharp increases in administrative review proceedings. Whatever the cause, the problems are here, and you who practice in the district courts and in the courts of appeals are feeling the effects. In some districts, the glut of criminal

cases makes it almost impossible to schedule a civil case for trial, and the time necessary for disposition of civil cases is increasing everywhere. Judges are unable to devote the necessary time and attention to each case as the load increases, and there is an increasing use of magistrates and encouragement of alternate forms of dispute resolution in the district courts. More and more cases are being dismissed for minor violations of scheduling orders. An impatient judiciary increasingly is turning to the use of sanctions to deter parties and attorneys from perceived violations of rules designed to prohibit unreasonable, vexatious or ungrounded litigation.²⁴ Ironically enough, applications for the imposition of sanctions may give rise to yet more litigation.²⁵ It seems to me that the courts are beginning to relax the standards for summary judgment and I do not believe that this development is unrelated to the caseload crunch. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,²⁶ and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,²⁷ decided by the Supreme Court at its last Term, appear to encourage this trend. The Chief Judge of my Court, in an opinion issued two weeks ago, referred to a study demonstrating a 79% affirmance rate on appeals to our Court from orders granting summary judgment.²⁸ The Chief wrote of the hope that the study would dispel the "misperception," as he put it, that we are unsympathetic to motions for summary judgment. The crushing caseload often is the cause of judges pushing harder for settlement than otherwise they might. I am not unaware that lawyers generally welcome some judicial intervention for

settlement purposes and that most, though not all, judges are happy to participate in negotiations. Sometimes, however, push becomes shove, with unfortunate results for all concerned. I have even heard rumors that the attorneys who staff our civil appeals management program²⁹ are known to apply the "full court press" in an effort to settle appeals. I have no personal knowlege of such things, of course.

Even with the assistance of the CAMP attorneys, the pro se attorneys and the motion attorneys who serve our court, we have been unable to avoid cutting some corners because of the number of cases appealed. We always have valued our tradition of oral argument and still allow it to anyone who asks. With twenty-seven or twenty-eight appeals per week, however, the average time allowed is fifteen minutes per side. I suggest that this is wholly inadequate in most of the cases, and many attorneys have expressed to me their frustrations at the time limitations on argument. Fifty-three percent of our cases in 1985 were disposed of by summary order rather than by signed or per curiam decisions.³⁰ The summary orders are not published and cannot be cited,³¹ much to the chagrin of the bar. I, too, find great difficulty with the use of summary orders, but the press of business leaves us no alternative.

There are but two options for those concerned about the future of the federal judiciary -- continue on the present course, with the expectation of incremental caseload increases and with expansion of the judiciary continually lagging behind

need; or divest and restructure some jurisdiction while refining procedural rules. As a proponent of the latter course, I offer the following:

1. Increase the amount in controversy required for diversity jurisdiction. I have come to accept the inevitable -- that diversity never will be eliminated, no matter how much of an anachronism it becomes. But give us a break! The amount in controversy figure was fixed at \$10,000 in 1958. A simple upward adjustment to account for inflation would have an important effect in reducing the caseload, according to informal estimates.

2. Fix a statute of limitations for state habeas cases, say five years. This would have the salutary effect of bringing the criminal litigation to a conclusion as well as cutting our caseloads. I think that five years should be enough for anyone to exhaust state remedies and to find any constitutional issues the federal courts might examine.

3. Require state prisoners to exhaust state administrative remedies before asserting federal constitutional rights respecting their conditions of confinement. A federal statute presently allows the court to stay such cases for up to ninety days to permit exhaustion of administrative remedies meeting acceptable standards.³² This statute must be strengthened to allow states the opportunity to address prisoner complaints in the first instance. I must admit that I was quite confused by the New York State Commissioner of Corrections, who was quoted in

the Wall Street Journal as saying that, although he spent one-quarter of his time giving depositions in these cases, he thought that it was good to have court decisions promoting consistency in the prison system.³³ I always thought that that was his job! The same article quoted me as saying that inmate litigation is a "problem crying out for a drastic curtailment of jurisdiction in the federal courts."

4. Cut back the criminal jurisdiction of the federal courts. The ever-expanding federal criminal jurisdiction threatens to engulf our courts with matters best left to state tribunals. The interests of federalism, as well as prudential concerns, argue for restriction of federal criminal jurisdiction to matters of true national interest. A thorough congressional study should be undertaken, with a view toward eliminating a large number of federal crimes duplicative of state legislation dealing with the same subject matter. Consideration should be given to conferring upon state courts jurisdiction over some federal crimes. Certain federal criminal statutes given expansive interpretation because of imprecise language should be amended to provide more specific descriptions of the prohibited conduct.

5. In all civil litigation, the successful litigant should receive all costs and attorneys fees expended in the suit. The American rule³⁴ should be abolished in the interest of simple fairness as well as to eliminate frivolous suits. I realize that recent attempts to put more bite into the modest fee-shifting provisions of Rule 68 have not been successful. However, I think

that the public would approve this proposal overwhelmingly if it were put to a vote.

6. Civil RICO should be repealed outright. A compromise bill to restrict the application of the civil provisions of RICO failed at the end of the last session of Congress.³⁵ As in most such situations, many interest groups had input, and nothing was accomplished. The Senate version of the bill was called the "Pattern of Illicit Activity Act," probably because it sounded better than "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act." Why we need any general federal law relating to civil fraud is not clear to me.

7. Eliminate unnecessary appellate argument by prescreening appeals. In spite of the Second Circuit tradition, I think it more important that selected cases have longer oral argument than that every case have some oral argument. Pro se litigants provide little or no assistance to the court through argument. When the proper disposition of a case is apparent from a glance at the briefs, there is no need to schedule that case for oral argument. The time is better spent with a case worthy of extended attention, and the overall result will be the faster movement of cases through the system.

8. Congress should be required to assess the impact on the federal courts of all new legislation. The assessment should be appended to each bill as a condition of the Act's passage, and should include projections of additional costs and personnel.

9. Exclusive jurisdiction of Federal Employers Liability Act cases should be conferred upon the state courts. There is no reason why railroad employees should have a choice of federal or state courts for what essentially are local tort actions.

10. Congress should create an independent commission to study the entire process of judicial review of administrative agency decisions. A number of questions should be formulated for the commission: What review functions should the courts perform? What should be the standard of review? Should there be different standards for different agencies? Is judicial review necessary in all cases? Is it necessary in social security cases to have review at both the district and circuit levels? Should review procedures within the agencies be strengthened? I suggest that the answer to these questions may result in legislation lessening the work of the federal courts in these areas.

Some of these proposals may appeal to you; some may not. In either case, I again invite you to join me in public discussions about the future of the federal courts, as we celebrate the 200th anniversary of the document that created them.

FEDERAL COURTS AT THE CROSSROADS

FOOTNOTES

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1. Commission on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, First Report 6 (Sept. 17, 1985).
 2. Miner, A Judge's Advice to Today's Law School Graduates, N.Y. St. B.J., Nov. 1985, at 6, 8.
 3. Miner, Victims and Witnesses: New Concerns in the Criminal Justice System, 30 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 757, 757 (1985).
 4. The Federalist No. 81, at 486 (A. Hamilton)(C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
 5. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeships Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, §§ 201(b), 202(e), 98 Stat. 342, 346-48 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 44(a), 133 (Supp. III 1985)).
 6. E.g., Judicial Conference of the United States, Report of Proceedings: September 19-20, 1984, at 53 (1984).
 7. Marvell, Are Caseloads Really Increasing?--Yes..., Judges' J., Summer 1986, at 35, 44 (Table 3).
 8. Id. at 42 (Table 1).
 9. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Pictorial Summary: United States Courts--1985, at 2 (1985).
 10. Id. at 3.
 11. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Federal Court Management Statistics: 1985, at 30 (1985).
 12. S. Flanders, Second Circuit Report 31 (1985).
 13. Id. at 6 (Table 3).
 14. Pictorial Summary, supra note 9, at 9 (Chart 3).
 15. Id.
 16. Federal Court Management Statistics, supra note 11, at 167 (pullout page).
 17. Id.
 18. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).

19. Federal Court Management Statistics, supra note 11, at 167 (pullout page).
20. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, 1964 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
21. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
22. United States v. Agilar, 779 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1385 (1986).
23. Pub. L. No. 98-473, §1111, 98 Stat. 2149 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 667 (Supp. III 1985)).
24. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
25. See, e.g., Oliveri v. Thompson, Nos. 86-7054, -7086 (2d Cir. Oct. 15, 1986).
26. 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986).
27. 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986).
28. Knight v. U.S. Fire Insurance Co., No. 86-7294, slip op. at 187 (2d Cir. Oct. 22, 1986)(Feinberg, C.J.).
29. See generally Kaufman, Must Every Appeal Run the Gamut? - The Civil Appeals Management Plan, 95 Yale L.J. 755 (1986).
30. Second Circuit Report, supra note 12, at 6.
31. See 2d Cir. R. 0.23.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1982).
33. Agins, Jailhouse Lawyers: Doing Time Can Mean Having Time to Learn Legal Ins and Outs, Wall St. J., Sept. 24, 1986, at 20, col. 2.
34. See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
35. See Strasser, RICO Changes are Blocked, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 27, 1986, at 10, col. 3.